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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Entrepreneurship
by
Yvonne (Yinghong) Zhang
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017
Professor Barton Hamilton, Chair
My papers have been focused on topics around entrepreneurship. From a micro perspective, my research
adds to the still sparse literature on the entrepreneurial decisions within a household framework; while from
a macro perspective, my research investigates the recent declining entrepreneurship in the United States
during the past two decades.
I start in Chapter 2 with the empirical finding that married people are more likely to be entrepreneurs than
their single counterparts. I identify a causal effect that marriage increases entrepreneurship by employing a
recent marriage policy reform in Australia as a natural experiment. The 2008 federal policy reform requires
de facto couples (similar to the common-law marriage) and married couples to be treated equally regarding
divorce or separation procedure in all states. I focus on two major states in Australia: Queensland which
already had a similar law in place, and New South Wales which had no such legislation prior to the 2008
reform. Using the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey data for the years 2001
to 2015, I demonstrate that the policy reform has a positive effect on marriage through a difference-in-
difference approach. By using the policy reform as an instrument variable, I show that marriage can increase
the likelihood to be an entrepreneur by 7.96% for men and 1.19% for women. However, this causal effect is
not consistent with the hypothesis from the family-insurance incentive, since I find a high rate of spouses
both being entrepreneurs. Instead, I show that this causal effect is driven by the commitment to a marital
relationship, which facilitates household specialization and joint entrepreneurship.
Chapter 3 investigates the downward trend of U.S. self-employment rate as observed in the last two
decades. Using data from the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-ORG), I
have decomposed this decline by gender, business incorporation status, industry, and entry/exit employment
dynamic. Both the downward trend of non-incorporated businesses and the increasing exiting-rate of self-
employment are recognized to be the primary causes of this decline. I have proposed an approach with Probit
viii
models to evaluate the net effect of intertwined determinants, and demonstrated that many variables such
as age and education have affected self-employment tendency differently for men and women. Moreover,
through Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, I have shown that the changing demographic factors could have
contributed to an increase in self-employment by 11.9%; while changes in the effects of these determinants
have resulted in a counterfactual decline in self-employment by 30.2%. Furthermore, I have analyzed the
effect of real wage on self-employment entry as well as the change in this effect over time. Overall, this
research provides insights into the future of entrepreneurship and informs economic policymaking.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Entrepreneurship plays an important role in the economy for many countries. In the United States, around
4.2 million people are operating full-time businesses, which comprises over 10% of the labor force. En-
trepreneurs also creates the majority of jobs. Governments have launched various programs to encourage
entrepreneurship, such as Tax Relief Act in the United States, Entrepreneurship Facilitators in Australia,
Unemployment compensation (UC) and a variety of active labor programs (ALPs) in Hungary and Poland.
However, being an entrepreneur can be a risky decision as an individual’s career, as established works have
shown that entrepreneurs on average have lower and more volatile incomes compared with salaried workers,
(Hamilton, 2000). Therefore, understanding the characteristics of entrepreneurs and individuals’ decisions
to be entrepreneurs is worthwhile for wise policymaking. Note, following many related empirical papers
(Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Dunn and Holtz
Eakin, 2000; Hamilton, 2000; Fairlie, 2002), I use the terms self-employment, entrepreneurship, and business
ownership interchangeably.
Many papers have studied entrepreneurial decisions from the individual perspective, Chapter 2 provides
a novel setting for studying entrepreneurship within a household framework. Existing theories have diverse
implications for being self-employed in a household. On the one hand, self-employed people contribute less
income to their family; but on the other hand, the family-insurance theory suggests that married people may
be more likely to take the risk of being self-employed than non-married people. Controlling for observed
characteristics, the simple regression results show that married people are 5% more likely to choose self-
employment than non-married people. However, some unobserved variables may bias this estimation. To
overcome the challenge for identification, I use the federal Australian policy reform that requires separating
de facto couples in all states to follow the same procedure as married couples’ divorce. Then through an
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Instrument Variable (IV) approach, the chapter identifies a causal effect of marriage on the decision to be
self-employed.
To explain the underlying mechanism, I argue that the current theory of family-insurance incentive does
not explain the full picture as I discover a high spousal correlation in being entrepreneurs. One’s spouse
being self-employed increases the likelihood of the subject’s being self-employed by 35% for males and 53%
for females. To explain both the positive effect of marriage on being self-employed and the high spousal
correlation, I propose a hypothesis that self-employment decisions are heavily influenced by the commitment
level within a relationship. This hypothesis is motivated by the fact that there is when I distinguish married
couples and de facto couples, the former has a stronger pattern in spouses’ both being entrepreneurs. Next,
the paper evidence that commitment level with a relationship has a statistical significant positive effect
on people’s likelihood to be entrepreneurs, as the level is measured the by marriage duration for married
couples and the reported probability of getting married for de facto non-married couples. Finally, I discuss
some policy implications that policymakers could encourage self-employment by promoting stronger marital
relationships. And family or marriage policies have profound influences on the labor market outcomes.
Chapter 3 is motivated by the recent decreasing self-employment rate in the United States, which has been
decreased from from 13% in 1994 to 8% in 2015 (or equivalently, a drop of 38.5%). This secular decline has
captured the public attention. Researchers have attempted to explain this decline of self-employment from
different perspectives, but no agreed answers have been reached. Nevertheless, understanding the underlying
reasons is important to predict the future of entrepreneurship, and evaluate entrepreneur-related policies.
This chapter decomposes self-employment trends from various perspectives, such as business incorporation
status, gender, and the transition of employment (focusing on self-employment entry and exit). Using panel
data from the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS ORG), I find that the
diminishing self-employment is driven by the decline of male non-incorporated self-employment, which is
similar to the notion of “necessity entrepreneur” in the literature. Meanwhile, the decomposition of self-
employment by industry indicates that the declining self-employment is mostly explained by the drop of
self-employment share in Business Service and Retail Trade sectors.
In contrast to many current papers, the chapter conducts separate analysis for men versus women, and non-
incorporated versus incorporated self-employment. These distinctions are proven to be crucial to understand
the influencing factors of the self-employment trend. Not only because these groups have substantially
different trends, but also because different factors affect the self-employment in these groups differently over
time.
Moreover, by decomposing the effect of employment transition (entry and exit of self-employment), this
chapter illustrates that the overall decreasing self-employment is mainly explained by an increasing rate of
2
people exiting their businesses. I pay particular attention to examine the real wage effect, and how these
effects change over time.
As a conclusion, Chapter 3 reveals the underlying channels of the decreasing self-employment in the United
States. It provides alternative explanations to our decomposition results and the changing effect of earning
on decisions to be self-employed. The results have rich policy implications and information for predicting
the future of entrepreneurship.
3
Chapter 2
How Does Family Structure Affect
Entrepreneurship?
2.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship plays an important role in the economy. In many countries, entrepreneurs provide a major
source of jobs, creates innovations, and contributes to a significant proportion of GDP and economic growth.
However, being an entrepreneur is risky as a career choice for an individual, since statistics have shown that
most entrepreneurs have lower and more volatile incomes than salaried workers on average. To promote
entrepreneurship, governments have implemented different programs, such as Entrepreneurship Facilitators
in Australia and Tax Relief Act in the United States1. Many papers have studied entrepreneurship from
the individual perspective, but this paper is among the first to study entrepreneurial decision in a household
framework.
It is documented that family firms comprise 80 percent of all businesses in many developed countries. In
my data, 66% of entrepreneurs are married. Nevertheless, there are both positive and negative implications
of being an entrepreneur in a family. On the one hand, given the lower and more volatile incomes of
entrepreneurs compared with salaried workers, a married person may be less willing to take the risk of being
self-employed. On the other hand, the family-insurance incentive suggests that married people may be more
likely to take the risk of being self-employed than non-married people. And married people value more of
the non-pecuniary benefit to be self-employed, such as flexible working time and working locations. (Gemici,
2011)
1Hungary and Poland launched Unemployment compensation (UC) and a variety of active labor programs (ALPs).
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Using data from The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) for the years 2001
to 2015 and controlling for the observed characteristics, I empirically find that married people are more likely
to be entrepreneurs. However, some unobserved factors that affect this relationship between marriage and
entrepreneurship. For example, higher skilled people may be more likely to get married, and at the same
time, they tend to be entrepreneurs. To overcome the challenge for identification, I take advantage of an
exogenous family law reform in Australia. In 2008, there was a federal announcement in Australia that de
facto couples2 (similar to common-law marriage) are subject to the same family law remedies as married
couples for all the states.3.
“Parties to an eligible de facto relationship which has broken down can apply to the Family Court or the
Federal Circuit Court to have financial matters determined in the same way as married couples. This covers
property division and any kind of maintenance/alimony payments”
In other words, the policy reform increases the huge costs of separating that were new for most de-facto
couples but had always existed for married couples. While they can still take advantage of benefits of living
together (such as joint consumption of a public good, returns to specialization, and children), de facto couples
will not enjoy the opportunity to hedge against future shocks to the relationship quality. Moreover, before
2008, the laws in terms of the dissolution of cohabitation were substantially different across the eight states
in Australia. Queensland introduced a regime that took a similar approach to marriage in 1990, whereas
New South Wales had little legislation beyond property law remedies. Other states were somewhere in
between, such as South Australia allowed property adjustments for non-married couples but only to account
for financial contributions and not broader contributions. I will focus on the two major states in Australia—
Queensland and New South Wales, since they provide a stark contrast in this legislation, and I have checked
that they have similar demographic structure and income structure. This policy reform offers a setting in
which the causal effect of the marriage structure on the self-employment decision can be neatly identified
through econometric approaches.
Moreover, I find a high correlation that if a person is self-employed, their spouse is more likely to be
self-employed, which seems counterintuitive from the perspective of risk sharing in a household. To resolve
this correlation by proposing “productivity complementarity,” and testing alternative theories. Particularly,
2A court will take into account: (1) how long you have been together; (2) the nature and extent of your common residence
and whether there is a sexual relationship between the parties; (3) your financial involvement may also be considered; (4) the
ownership of your property; (5) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; (6) whether the relationship is registered
under a State law; (7) the care and support of children; (8) the reputation and public aspects of your relationship; (9) Applying
for property adjustment and/or maintenance orders.
3For more information, please check: http://www.federalcircuitcourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/fccweb/family-law-
matters/divorce-and-separation/defacto-relationships/de-facto-relationships
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I propose that commitment level within a relationship has a positive effect on the self-employment decision
in a household. Commitment in a marital relationship relates to communication, spending time together,
doing things for each other and supporting each other. Once a lack of commitment, from one or both parties,
is established and neither person is willing to work at the marriage, the relationship can deteriorate. I will
measure commitment level by marriage duration for married couples, and reported probability to get married
for de facto couples. I will also analyze the household specialization and check the subjective satisfaction
toward work/life among couples.
The contributions of my study are four-fold. First, I use plausibly exogenous variation in family law to
identify the causal effect of the marriage on the decision to be self-employed. Second, it adds to the still sparse
literature on the self-employment decision within a household framework. I argue that the current family-
insurance incentive of marriage does not fully explain why more people become entrepreneurs after they
get married. Instead, I argue that this causal effect is driven by the commitment to a marital relationship,
which facilitates household specialization and joint entrepreneurship. Third, I stress the importance of
distinguishing married and de facto couples when discussing the household structure. Finally, one policy
implication from my results is that policy that affects household formation could affect the labor market
participation. Note that the study of Australia situation in this paper can be extended to other countries as
well, as Blanchflower and Meyer (1994) compare Australia and the United States and find that the patterns
of self-employment and factors affecting self-employment decisions are broadly similar.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses alternative theories toward the implication of being
self-employed in a household and couples choose to be self-employed. Section 3 describes HILDA data and
provides some reduced-form evidence with simple regressions that being married has a high correlation of
being self-employed. Section 4 explains the 2008 marriage policy reform in Australia and identifies the
causality between marital structure on the self-employment decision. Section 5 examines the underlying
mechanisms why marriage increases entrepreneurship. Section 6 proposes alternative theories to explain
household’s joint employment decisions. The last section concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Background
This section introduces two branches of literature, as well as the current debate over legal protection for the
de facto relationship. The first category of literature discusses diverse implications for being self-employed in
a household. As we mentioned earlier, a self-employed person may contribute less income to the family and
their income is more volatile, which suggests that married people would be less willing to be self-employed.
In addition, other forms of employer-provided compensation, such as health insurance and pensions, are
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not applicable to self-employed workers. (Hamilton, 2000) If this is the case, then why do we observe the
opposite that a married person is significantly more likely to be self-employed?
The commonly accepted theory answers the question by considering family-insurance motive. For example,
a single man has to take all the risk of being an entrepreneur. However, when a wife takes a salaried job
to receive a risk-free salary, her husband will have a less financial burden to set up his own business since
his spouse may financially support the family. An empirical analysis by Hundley (2006) shows that men
with higher family incomes are more likely to be self-employed. And we expect that the insurance motive
for married people is stronger than for de facto couples and single people, which seems to be in congruent
with our finding that the self-employment share is larger among married than de facto couples and single
counterparts.
The second theory explains the non-pecuniary benefits of being self-employed in a household. For ex-
ample, Hamilton (2000) claims that the driving force for people to be self-employed is the non-pecuniary
benefit of being your own boss. Yurdagul (2017) examines the flexibility in working hours as a motive for
entrepreneurship. Adda, et. al (2017) estimate the career costs of having children, and discusses the female’s
tendency to selecting more child-friendly occupations. Even though they excluded self-employment in their
analysis, they pointed out that flexibility in working time can be especially important for a family with
children. Another kind of non-pecuniary benefit of self-employment is flexibility in working location. Gemici
(2011) studies family migration and labor market outcomes, and argues that working location constraints
have created inefficiency and hindered the wage growth. Another hypothesis is that self-employed workers
have more freedom to adjust their work efforts in response to changing needs for market work income and
household production (Hundley, 2000); these workers may be more satisfied with their jobs because of in-
creased autonomy, flexibility, and skill utilization (Hundley, 2001). The most recent paper by Wellington et
al. (2006) and Ostrovsky et al. (2016) confirm the role of self-employment in helping women improve the
balance between family and work. They use a unique dataset that links individual records from the 2006
Census of Population to records from the 2011 National Household Survey, and assert that becoming a new
mother increases a woman’s probability of becoming self-employed as opposed to being a salaried worker.
Another widely debated issue is the tax incentive of being self-employed. Having one person in a household
working as self-employed provides a way to manipulate the family tax rate. One benefit in Australia is that
if the family reports lower income, they pay lower tax or they can get job-seeker subsidies (which apply only
when the income of the self-employed person is lower than a certain level).
Other related literature focuses on the influence of spousal considerations on male and female labor
market choices. Wellington (2006) suggests that married women with greater family responsibilities are
more likely to be self-employed. Earlier works by Lundberg and Pollak (1993, 1996) stress that gender
7
specialization in the provision of household public goods ensures that only one spouse makes a positive
contribution. Chiappori et al. (2002) provide a bargaining framework to analyze the marriage market
impact on household labor supply. Their model imposes new restrictions on the labor supply functions
and eases the identification of individual preferences and the intra-household decision process. Gliebe et al.
(2002) analyze travel diary data, suggesting that employment commitments and childcare responsibilities
have significant effects on the tradeoffs between joint and independent activities. The second category of
literature considers the household’s joint decision to be self-employed, and explains the effect of a partner’s
being self-employed on the other partner’s employment choice. Donald (1999) claims that whether husbands
have businesses matters when married women enter self-employment. Earlier work by Beckhard and Dyer
(1983) finds that family businesses contribute about 40% of the gross national product and over half of the
national employment in the US. Tagiuri and Davis (1996) claim that family firms are still the predominant
form of business organization in the world. Statistics from Family Business Australia (FBA) report that
around 70% of businesses in Australia are family-owned and operated, with many of the small enterprises
being operated by a husband and wife (or at least starting out that way). Given that Australia does not
provide specific tax benefits (or other subsidies) for families in which both couples are as entrepreneurs, then
why do we observe a high rate of spousal joint-entrepreneurship?
The above mentioned family-insurance incentive suggests that couples in which both individuals are
entrepreneurs would be riskier because the earning volatility is much higher than salaried works. Moreover,
the theory of non-pecuniary benefit is ambiguous concerning this correlation. Hamilton (2000) argues that
the driving force of being self-employed is the non-pecuniary benefit of being one’s own boss, which seems
to be non-sharable with other family members. However, if spouses work together as self-employed, both of
them can enjoy this benefit of being their own boss. Other non-pecuniary benefits such as location flexibility
and working-hour flexibility, are not strong enough to justify both couples being self-employed.
Nevertheless, there are other hypotheses advocating couples’ being self-employed together. The first
hypothesis argues that both couples working as self-employed can increase economic efficiency because the
couples work together and put all their effort to support the business based on their skills. Sanders et
al. (1996) study immigrant self-employment, and consider the family as social capital. They clarify that
the family facilitates the pooling of labor power and financial resources, because the family has collective
interests and strong personal ties. This paper will test the theory of efficiency by analyzing the earning and
working profile of the couples grouped by different joint employment choices.
The second hypothesis is that family-run business has less moral hazard issue than a regular partnership.
Jungho (2016) discusses the reasons people form business partnerships. He regards the moral hazard prob-
lem between regular partners as a cost for the partnership in a business. Tagiuri and Davis (1996) argue
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that family businesses develop a strong sense of mission for their firm, and they allow for more efficient
communication with greater privacy and thus improve communication and business decisions that support
the business. On the other hand, couples could enjoy leisure together if they are self-employed together.
The third category of related papers involves marriage law and its implications for the labor market.
Voena (2015) explains that the introduction of unilateral divorce depends on property division regime. In
a state with community property law where the property is divided equally, unilateral divorce leads to a
higher accumulation of assets, and women are less likely to work than in the states where the property is not
divided equally. Voena (2015) develops and estimates a dynamic model involving household bargaining, and
claims that the Pareto weight of women rose significantly in the new unilateral-divorce regime. In Australia,
the 2008 marriage law reform can be regarded as an introduction of a community property law for de facto
couples to the existing unilateral-divorce regime. Based on Voena’s theory, we expect this policy change may
have some effects on the marriage formation and marriage dissolution.
This paper considers “de facto non-married relationships” in Australia. These relationships are defined as
couples who have either lived together for no less than two years or have a child together, which is similar to
the common-law marriage in the United States, and “cohabitation” in many other countries. An earlier work
by Brien et al. (2006) propose a tradeoff for cohabiting couples: while taking advantage of the benefits of
living together (such as joint consumption of public goods, returns to specialization and children), cohabiting
couples face a lower cost of separation than married couples, which gives them the opportunity to hedge
against future bad shocks to the relationship quality. However, the lack of commitment in a cohabiting
relationship relative to marriage can increase the chance of dissolution, which may prevent the couple from
fully realizing some of these benefits. Gemici and Laufer (2014) study the welfare implications of extending
protections inherent in marriage to non-married cohabiting partners. They emphasize that compared with
married couples, non-married cohabitants do not need to follow strict procedures to dissolve their living
arrangements. Recent research by Fisher et al. (2015) suggest that cohabitants are less in need of legal
protection than was previously thought, whereas existing protection for divorcees is less effective. They
discuss different financial implications of relationship break down for married and cohabiting couples in the
UK. They argue that the income loss on separation for women who were cohabiting is less than the loss for
those who were married, and the difference cannot be explained by differences in access to benefits or labor
supply responses after separation.
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2.3 Data and Reduced-Form Evidence
This paper uses the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey as its main
source of data. The HILDA survey is a household-based panel study conducted since 2001, which covers
extremely broad areas, including household structure and formation, income and economic well-being, and
employment and labor force participation. Interviews of all adult members of each household are conducted
annually. In the survey, a household is defined as “a group of people who usually reside and eat together.”
The first wave of this panel survey consisted of 7,682 households and 19,914 individuals. In 2011 (wave 11),
the survey started to take an additional 2,153 households and 5,477 individuals. The panel members are
followed over time. The survey tracks the individuals rather than tracking the households according to their
locations. Annual interviews are conducted with all people aged 15 and over and one person also answers
question s about the household as a whole4.
The wave 1 sample is automatically extended over time by following rules that add to the sample any
children born to or adopted by members of the selected households, and any new household members resulting
from changes in the composition of the original households. Many of these new sample members, however,
only remain in the sample for as long as they live with an original sample member. The exceptions to this
rule are children born to or adopted by an original sample member and any new sample entrants who have a
child with an original sample member. These individuals are added to the sample on a permanent basis. The
reference population for the initial sample was, with only minor exceptions, all persons residing in private
dwellings in Australia.
Studies about marriage and labor dynamics in the United States often rely on the data from PSID. But
by 1989, PSID had experienced a 50% sample loss due to cumulative attrition from the original 1968 sample
(Fitzgerald et al. 1998). Lillard and Panis (1998) also note that married couples are more likely to continue
in PSID compared to single individuals, and the likelihood of attrition decreases considerably as the duration
of marriage increases. In contrast, in HILDA, around 90% of subjects are well tracked, and HILDA contains
rich information about family and labor dynamics with a large sample in Australia. Wooden et al. (2007)
introduce the HILDA survey and its contribution to economic and social research in detail.
For this paper, the most valuable part of the survey is its data on employment and marital characteristics
at each wave. For example, it has detailed information on employment, earnings, and total labor market
experience of household members. The employment status of the individuals is obtained through the number
of hours they work during the year. An individual is considered to be working if their work hours exceed
1000 hours for a given year. In particular, I focus on three employment choices: employee (salaried worker),
4More details about the survey are in Watson et al. (2004).
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self-employed, and not working. Note that “entrepreneur” in many datasets is grouped as “self-employed”
in terms of employment status, and hence I use “self-employed” and “entrepreneur” interchangeably. The
definition of “employee” is “a person who works for a public or private employer and receives remuneration
in wages, salary, a retainer fee from their employer while working on a commission basis, tips, piece-rates,
or payment in kind; or a person who operates his or her own incorporated enterprise with or without hir-
ing employees” (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006).5 In contrast, a person who operates their own
unincorporated business is treated as an “own account worker” (i.e., self-employed). Although the precise
definition of “self-employed” varies among the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Internal Revenue Service and
private research firms, self-employed people include independent contractors, sole proprietors of businesses
and those with partnerships in businesses. The definition in Australia is a sole trader or a partner in a
partnership. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) uses the terms “self-employed” and “own account
workers” interchangeably to refer to people who operate their own economic enterprise or engage indepen-
dently in a profession or trade, and hire no employees, and run unincorporated businesses (ABS, 2006, p.
119). Regarding marital statuses, I consider three groups: married, de facto non-married, and single.
Table 2.1 describes my sample selection. I drop disabled individuals and full-time studying subjects, and
those who did not report their marital status and employment status. For most analyses in this paper, age
is controlled to be within the range of 18 to 50. All statistic reports are adjusted by personal weight in
the survey. For notation purpose, I use “SW” as “Salaried Worker”, “SE” as “Self-Employed,” and “NW”
as “Not working.” In our sample, 72.6% are “SW”, 11.6% are “SE,” 15.8% are “Not working.” I focus on
three marital groups: married (48.4%), de facto non-married (20.7%), and single (30.9%), including never
married, separated, divorced, widowed).
I categorize four groups by education attainment: “<HS” is less than high school; “HS/some qualif” is
high school or some qualification, including Nursing qualification, Teaching qualification, Trade certificate or
apprenticeship, Technicians cert. / Advanced certificate, Other certificate; “Associate” is associate diploma;
and “BA/MS/PHD” includes undergraduate diploma, Bachelor degree but not honours, Honours bachelor
degree, Post-graduate diploma, Masters degree and Doctorate.6 Table A1 in the Appendix illustrates the
mean weekly earning and the standard deviation by gender and employment, education, and marital statuses.
I use the derived weekly main job income from the survey, and adjust it to the price level in 20017. These
statistics are consistent with the fact that for both men and women, self-employed workers on average gain
less earning than salaried workers in each education and marital group. The standard deviation suggests that
5In other words, their definition of employee includes managers who operate their own incorporated businesses (they are
treated as “employees of their own business”).
6In our sample, 21.5% are “<HS,” 18.2% are “HS/some qualif,” 32.2% are “Associate,” and 28.1% are “BA/MS/PHD.”
7Price level is downloaded from OECD data, referring to https://data.oecd.org/price/price-level-indices.htm
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self-employment is “riskier” than a salaried job, regardless of marital status and educational attainment.
Table 2.2 summarizes the statistics of employment status and marital status by gender, showing that
most self-employed people are married: 63.0% of self-employed men are married, and the number is even
higher for women: 71.4%. Meanwhile, in terms of the self-employment rate among the three marital groups
(defined as the number of self-employed individuals divided by total labor force in that group), I find that
the rate is the highest among the married group (21.0% for males, and 11.4% for females), compared with
the de facto group (13.2% for males, and 5.9% for females), and the single group (8.9% for males, and 3.8%
for females). Considering the difference in the marital and employment choices for men and women, I will
distinguish them for the following analyses. For example, by gender, the overall self-employment rate is
15.4% for men and 8.0% for women.
2.3.1 Reduced-form evidence: simple regressions
Does the correlation of self-employment status and marital status in the last section imply any causality
between them? This section will show some reduced-form results on whether marital status affects self-
employment choice, or vice versa. I will consider some observed characteristics, such as age, education,
state, children, nationality, and time trend, that are supposed to matter for employment and marital status.
Does marital structure affect the decision to be self-employed?
To examine whether marital status may affect the self-employment decision, I use binomial Probit model as
specified below.
Φ−1(P (SEi,t = 1)) = β0 + β1I(married) + β2I(de facto) + β3Xi,t + β4t · yeart + i,t
where SEi,t is a dummy variable for self-employment status of individual i at time t. X is individual
characteristics, including marital status, marriage duration, age, education, state, nationality, children. The
baseline of marital status is single. I(married) and I(de facto) are respectively dummy variables indicating
whether the subject is married or in a de facto relationship. Note that coefficients for Probit models can
be interpreted as the difference in Z score associated with each one-unit difference in the predictor variable.
In this model, the Probit margins associated with β1 and β2 are our main coefficient of interest
8. Table
2.3 shows the Probit average marginal effect for the subject to be self-employed by gender and employment
status. It is noticeable that the ranking of propensity for self-employment is married > de facto > single.
The results are robust if I use OLS regression instead. Other robustness checks will be discussed later.
8Stata has many handy commands such as “margins” and “marginsplot” for making sense of the Probit regression results.
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Are self-employed people more likely to get married?
This part examines whether self-employment status affects the probability of a single person getting married
or being in a de facto relationship:
Ji,t = I(β0 + β1I(SE last year) + β2 ·Xi,t + β3 · yeart + ui,t > 0)
In this Probit model, I take the sample of subjects who were single in the last period. The dependent
variable Ji,t is either “married” or “de facto” for individual i at time t. I(self -employed last year) is a
dummy variable, indicating whether the person was self-employed at time t − 1. Thus, β1 estimates the
effect of self-employment status on marriage formation, which is our main coefficient of interest. Xi,t stands
for the subject’s demographic characteristics. And I also control for the year trend.
Table 2.4 summarizes the Probit results. For both genders, the estimated coefficients β1 are not sig-
nificantly different, which suggest that a self-employed person (who was single in the last period) is not
significantly more likely to get married or engage in a de facto relationship than their counterpart who
works as a salaried worker or is unemployed. Further, I have checked that even after controlling for their
earnings, there is no significant difference between the salaried worker and self-employed worker regarding
the probability of getting married. Conclusions are the same if I use an OLS regression instead of a Probit
model.
Table A5 in the Appendix shows the propensity score of getting married by employment status, where
I compare the results between controlling for wage and not. It is obvious that salaried worker and self-
employed individuals are significantly more likely to get married than those who are not working. However,
I test that the difference in the propensity scores is negligible between salaried workers and self-employed
individuals, regardless of their wage. I further control the employment status and other characteristics of the
current partner for couples (married couples and de facto couples), referring to Table A6 in the Appendix.
Again, I find that working as self-employed does not increase the likelihood to get married compared with
salaried workers. In conclusion, self-employment status is not likely to be a determinant of marital status.
2.4 Causality of Marital Structure on Entrepreneurship
The empirical findings and reduced form results suggest that marital structure may affect the entrepreneurial
decision. However, before I claim the causality, I concern whether some unobserved characteristics other
than marital status can affect the decision to be entrepreneurs. This section will introduce my identification
strategy to use the 2008 marriage law reform in Australia as an instrumental variable.
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2.4.1 Marriage policy reform
De facto non-married couples, when compared with their married counterparts, do not usually need to follow
strict procedures to dissolve their living arrangements. This feature of cohabitation enables partners to take
advantage of the benefits of living together, without the commitment legal marriage requires. However,
in 2008, Australia federal court announced that if a de facto relationship ends, the parties apply to the
Family Court or the Federal Circuit Court to have financial matters determined in the same way as married
couples, which includes property division and any maintenance or alimony payments. And the public was
not aware of this law change before the policy was announced. This means that de facto couples have faced
the same cost of separation as married couples since the law became effective in March 2009. While they
can still take advantage of benefits of living together (such as joint consumption of a public good, returns to
specialization, and children), de facto couples will not enjoy the opportunity to hedge against future shocks
to the relationship quality.
The policy reform has two major effects on people’s attitude towards de facto relationship and marriage.
On the one hand, a single person would be more careful before they get involved in a de facto relationship.
Moreover, for those who already lived together for less than two years, the reform affects their decision on
whether they would extend their relationship to two years or more, and on whether they would have a first
child. On the other hand, for many de facto couples, especially for those who have planned to get married,
the policy might cause them to get married sooner to receive the tax benefit for married couples. Before
analyzing the data, it is ambiguous which effect dominates.
Figure 2.1 in the Appendix, based on HILDA survey data, illustrates that the overall trend of marriage
share was decreasing before the policy reform in 2008, and flattened after that. The policy’s effect on the
direction of de facto trend is the opposite—it was increasing over time before 2008 and flattened afterward.
And the figure indicates that the fraction of single people stays at the similar level over time (for each state)
around 30 percent. Given this fact, I will focus on the married and de facto couples for this section.
In Australia, there are eight states, and one of the major states—Queensland (QSL) had a similar law
towards de facto relationships since 1990, but in another major state—New South Wales (NSW), there were
not any legal protections for the dissolution of the de facto relationship. Other states have laws relevant
to different degrees. For example, South Australia allowed property adjustments for unmarried couples but
only to account for financial contributions and not broader types of contributions.
In the following context, I will focus on NSW and QSL, since these two states provide a stark contrast
regarding this policy adoption. And with the HILDA panel data, I have 7 years data before the law reform
in 2008 and 7 years data after this change. Around 29% of our sample is from NSW, and 23% is from QSL. I
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also compare some demographic features of the two states (refer to Table A7 in the Appendix) and conclude
that NSW and QSL have very similar age profiles, employment structures, education structures, and income
situations. I focus on the age range of 18 to 50 because the age distribution of first marriage is concentrated
from age 18 to 50 (See Figure A2 in the Appendix), and this age range has adequate dynamics of people’
employment decisions.
2.4.2 Impact of the family policy reform on marriage
The 2008 policy reform in Australia and the state variation intrigues us to apply a difference-in-difference
(DID) method for the causal effect identification. The natural experiment consists of two groups: a “control
group” that remains untreated for two periods, and a “treatment group” that is treated at the second period.
In our context, QSL is the control group, whereas New South Wales is the “switcher,” which is the unit that
becomes treated after 2008. And to my best knowledge, there was no other policy change around 2008 that
directly affects self-employment decisions.
In a standard version of DID, the first step is to test the “common trend” assumption: whether the trend
on the mean outcome without treatment is the same in both groups. This step is to ensure that I can
correctly estimate the effect of the treatment by comparing the evolution of the mean outcome in the two
groups. Figure A1 in the Appendix illustrates the trend of marital status in the two states. I notice that
the share of the singles group did not vary in either NSW or QSL. And the marriage share had a smooth
decrease from 53% to 40% in QSL. Figure 2.2 further compares the trends of marriage and de facto shares in
the two states by adding a fitted linear trend considering the policy difference. The share of married people
in QSL has a smooth declining trend from 2001 to 2015, while in NSW there was a difference before and
after 2008. These graphs suggest that the policy change has affected people’s marriage choice in New South
Wales. Such a difference of time trend for the two states can be captured in the following regression test:
Marriedi,t =β
NSW
af2008 ∗ I(NSW ) ∗ I(af 2008) ∗ time+ βNSWbf2008 ∗ I(NSW ) ∗ I(bf 2008) ∗ time
+ βQSLaf2008 ∗ I(QSL) ∗ I(af 2008) ∗ time+ βQSLbf2008 ∗ I(QSL) ∗ I(bf 2008) ∗ time
+ β0 + β ∗ I(QSL) + i,t
where Married is a dummy variable indicating whether this person is married or not; I(QSL) is added to
allow for the inherent difference in marriage share across the two states. I(after 2008) is the dummy variable
indicating whether the subject is in the period after the policy reform. time is defined as year − 2000. The
coefficients βNSWaf2008 and β
NSW
bf2008 estimate the trend of marriage share in NSW after 2008 and before 2008
15
respectively; while βQSLaf2008 and β
QSL
bf2008 estimate this trend in QSL after 2008 and before 2008 respectively.
I have to assume that other environmental changes during the period of study do not affect the marriage
shares in the two states differently.9
Table 2.6 shows the tests of difference-in-difference in the break of 2008. The result of the test (3),
(βNSWaf2008 − βNSWbf2008) − (βQSLaf2008 − βQSLbf2008) = 0, rejects the hypothesis (at the confidence interval of 5%) that
there is no difference in the difference of marriage trend between the two states before and after the reform.
The test (2) of βQSLaf2008 − βQSLbf2008 = 0 and the test (3) of βNSWaf2008 − βNSWbf2008 = 0 suggest that the marriage
trend before and after 2008 is not significant different in QSL, but changed in NSW. And from the test (4) of
βNSWaf2008 − βNSWbf2008 >= 0, I infer that there was an upward change in NSW after 2008, which further suggests
that the 2008 reform had a positive effect on the marital decision. Similar tests are applied to the trend of
de facto share in QSL and NSW. I find that while the trend of de facto share in QSL steadily increases over
time, the increasing trend in NSW flattened after the policy reform. The share of single people, according
to my tests, stayed stable in both states. This suggests that the marriage reform tends to propel some de
facto non-married couples to get married.
2.4.3 Impact of the family policy reform on self-employment
This subsection discusses whether and how the marriage law reform affects employment choice through
affecting people’s marital choice. I assume that the marriage law does not affect self-employment directly.
Figure 2.3 shows the self-employment share with a fitted linear trend in the two states allowing for the break
in 2008. I find that in QSL, the self-employment share decreased steadily; in NSW, the trend was similar
to QSL after 2008, but before 2008, the decreasing trend was sharper. In our context, we are interested in
whether and how the policy affects self-employment through affecting marriage.
The following approach attempts to distinguish the policy’s impact on self-employment decision for mar-
ried and de facto couples. Concerning the different time trend in the two states, I control the interaction
term time = year − 2000 with state dummy variable. And state fixed-effect is controlled or unobserved
influence on marriage and employment that vary across states (referring to Friedberg, 1998).
SEi,m,t = β0+β1,i,m ·policy+β2,i,m ·state+β3,i,m ·state∗ time+β4,i,m ·state∗ time2+β5,i,m ·Xi,m,t+ui,m,t
where SEi,m,t is the dummy variable whether the person is self-employed. i stands for gender (either male
or female); m stands for marital status (either married or de facto), t stands for the year of the observation.
9For example, the 2008 financial crisis should affect the marital decision similarly in the two states. Then I can test the
effect of the 2008 marriage policy reform on marriage share and the difference between the two states.
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The coefficient β1 estimates the policy’s impact on self-employment choice.
Table A9 in Appendix shows the estimated results of being self-employed by marital status. After the
2008 policy reform, married people, especially married women, were more likely to be self-employed, while
for de facto couples, the policy had a negative effect on self-employment. One interpretation of this result
is that the group of de facto non-married partners who remain de facto non-married is more likely to be at
the lower range of relationship commitment, and thus the self-employment rate among this group is lower.
Table A8 in the Appendix shows the propensity score of singles and de facto couples for getting married
in the two states, where I control the demographic characteristics and time trend. Again, a self-employed
person is not significantly more likely to get married or engage in a de facto relationship than a salaried
worker.
2.4.4 Estimation approach
In the first stage, I estimate the treatment effect of the 2008 marriage reform on the marriage decision. In the
second stage, I estimate the probability to be self-employed using predicted probability to get married from
the first stage. In other words, the first step estimates the policy’s direct impact on the marital decision,
while the second step estimates policy’s indirect effect on the self-employment decision through the channel
of affecting marital choice. The regressions are specified as follows:
Stage1 : marriedi,t = γ0 + γ1 · I(policy) + γ2 · state+ γ3 · state ∗ timet + γ4 ·Xi,t + vi,t
Stage2 : SEi,t = β0 + β1 · ˆP (married) + β2 · state+ β3 · state ∗ timet + β4 ·Xi,t + ui,t
where i stands for gender (either male or female); t is the year. SEi,t is a dummy variable: SEi,t = 1
means this person is of gender i, and is self-employed at time t. I(policy) is a dummy variable, and
I(policy) = 1 if State = NSW, year >= 2009 or State = QSL; I(policy) = 0 if State = NSW, year <=
2008. Xi,t includes some demographic characteristics, such as state, age, age
2, education, nationality and
dummy variables about children. In the data, there are four different ranges of children, for example, i.kid0-4
are dummies for the number of children whose age is from 0-4 (similar definition for i.kid5-9, i.kid10-14,
i.kid15-24).
I assume u and v are independent of X and the policy. ˆP (married) is the predicted probability to get
married estimated from the first equation. Thus β1 estimates the reform’s indirect effect on self-employment
share through affecting marriage. And hence β2 indicates the state difference in terms of self-employment
rate. I allow the slope of time trend among states to be different, which is specified in β3.
Table 2.7 shows the estimation results of Stage 1. I find that (with 10% confidence level) the policy
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reform has increased the probability to get married by 9.21% for male, and 3.23% for female. Table 2.8 is
the estimation results of Stage 2. I find that getting married will increase the probability to be self-employed
by 7.96% for male and 1.19% for female. It is also noticeable that these estimations are different from
the Probit model results in Table 2.3 (section 2.3.1), which are 3.5% for male and 5.3% for female. The
estimations from Probit models (or OLS regressions) underestimate the marriage’s effect on self-employment
choice for men, while they overestimate this effect for women. This estimation gap is potentially due to some
unobserved factors that positively (negatively) affect married women’s (men’s) choice to be entrepreneurs
rather than marriage itself. For example, women with higher skills may be more likely to get married, and
they are more likely to be entrepreneurs. Similarly, higher skilled men may be more likely to get married,
but their skills may suggest that they could get a better paid salaried job, which decreased their likelihood
to be entrepreneurs.
2.4.5 Other impacts of the family policy reform
There are other effects of this marriage policy reform. For example, I have checked whether the policy has
an effect on the age to get married. Figure A4 in the Appendix illustrates that people tended to get married
at a relative younger age after the policy. This is consistent with the policy’s positive effect on marriage.
And the following regression estimates how this policy reform has affected individual income:
log(incomei,m,t) = β0 + β1 · policy + β2 · state+ β3 · state ∗ time+ β4 · state ∗ time2 + β5 ·Xi,m,t + ui,m,t
where log(incomei,m,t) stands for the (natural) log weekly income of the individual whose gender is i and
marital status is m at time t. The coefficient β1 estimates the policy’s impact on the income.
I find that the policy does not change the income level. Table A10 shows the estimation results for self-
employed persons, conditional on that their partner is working (either SE or SW). This conclusion differs
from some of the results in Voena (2015), where she finds that the introduction of unilateral divorce law to
a community property regime negatively affects the women’s labor force participation and income. In our
context, the family law change in Australia introduces a community property law to a unilateral divorce
regime for de facto couples. This difference can reveal the importance to distinguish de facto relationship
and married couples to analyze households’ labor decisions. The next section will discuss the mechanisms
why married people are more likely to be entrepreneurs than non-married people.
18
2.5 How Does Marriage Increase Entrepreneurship?
In Section 2.2 of theoretical backgrounds, I have introduced the implications of being an entrepreneur in
a family from both positive and negative aspects. Since the last section has established that marriage
increases entrepreneurship, this section will focus on the theories that explain why marriage can positively
affect entrepreneurship.
2.5.1 Family-Insurance Incentive
The theory of family-insurance incentive is commonly accepted and quite intuitive: suppose a person wants
to be an entrepreneur, it is more insured to do so after they get married since their partner could earn income
to support the family. This theory favors a hypothesis of a couple that one partner becomes an entrepreneur
while the other partner is a salaried worker. However, this implication is not consistent with my finding
that it is more likely each partner in a married couple is an entrepreneur than that only one of partner is an
entrepreneur. 10
The rest part of this subsection takes a closer look at households’ joint employment choice. Using HILDA
data (full sample), I first build a household profile by pairing a married or de facto non-married individual
with his or her partner, matching the partner’s ID. The couples with the same gender are deleted (only 562
observations) to avoid some difficulties such as marriage preference and gender wage gap. I find that one’s
self-employment decisions are highly correlated with spouse employment status, as I calculate the following
conditional probabilities:
Pmale(SE|wife is SE) = 60.36% > Pmale(SE|wife is not SE) = 16.5%
Pmale(SE|de facto partner isSE) = 50.2% > Pmale(SE|de facto partner is not SE) = 12.0%
Pfemale(SE|husband is SE) = 31.6% > Pfemale(SE|husband is not SE) = 5.8%
Pfemale(SE|de facto partner isSE) = 21.7% > Pfemale(SE|de facto partner not SE) = 3.6%
Table A2 and A3 in the Appendix have more details about this correlation. I notice that the high
correlation of spousal self-employment is stronger for females. For example, 60% of self-employed women
have a self-employed partner, while for self-employed men, the rate is around 30%. 11 The next subsection
examines whether the high correlation in couples’ self-employment choice still exist if I control couples’ joint
demographic characteristics.
10Among those couples with at least one person being self-employed, nearly 30% of them have both couples involved in
self-employment.
11Note that the high correlation of being self-employed together does not necessarily mean a high proportion of both husband
and wife working as self-employed. Only 7.1% of household involve both working as self-employed.
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2.5.2 Correlation in couples’ self-employment choice
Among those married or de facto couples, I pair each individual with their partner using partner’s ID, and
keep track of their partner’s characteristics. The following Probit model estimates the effect of partner’s
self-employment status on the propensity for the subject to be self-employed.
SEi,t = I(β0 + β1I(partner is SE) + β2Xi,t + β3X
partner
i,t + β4t · yeart + i,t > 0)
where X is individual characteristics, including age, education, state, nationality, children. For married
couples, X also includes marriage duration. Table 2.9 shows the Probit results: the propensity for the subject
to be self-employed is significantly higher for those whose partner is also self-employed than whose partner
is a salaried worker.
I conduct some robustness check. For example, I add some joint characteristics of a household to check
the implication of assortative mating in the joint employment choice. Table A12 shows the results of
Probit models that add joint education and age gap. Clearly, the partner’s self-employment status positively
predicts the propensity for the subject to choose self-employment. Specifically, a married man is 42.0% more
likely to be self-employed if his partner is self-employed. The rate is 25.3% for a married woman, 36.0% for a
man in a de facto relationship, and 19.2% for a woman in a de facto relationship. Thus, this high correlation
in partner self-employment choice is much more intensive within married couples than de facto couples.
Table A13 adds individual fixed effect and controls for the subject’s employment status in the previous
period. I find that the positive correlation is still significant. For example, a man is 9.5% more likely to be
self-employed if his partner is also self-employed, compared to a man whose partner is a salaried worker.
All these results suggest that being married or in a de facto relationship positively predicts the propensity
for being self-employed, and one is more likely to be self-employed if their partner is also self-employed. This
result is not consistent with the discussed family-insurance motive. To fully understand the mechanism why
marriage increases entrepreneurship, the next subsection proposes an alternative hypothesis.
2.5.3 Self-employment and commitment level in a relationship
From the last subsection, it is noticeable that the spousal employment correlations are stronger for married
couples than for de facto couples. What is the fundamental difference between married and de facto couples?
Many de facto couples stay cohabited is because they want to test the quality of their relationship before
they get married officially. If we acknowledge that de facto couples are less committed to their partners
than married couples are, the questions follow: does the commitment level affect the decision to be an
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entrepreneur? This subsection finds evidence to answer this question within married couples and within
de facto couples. Among married couples, I use marriage duration as a proxy for their commitment level.
The reported marriage duration ranged from 0.005 to 33 years. I calculate the self-employment rate in
each bin grouped by the year of marriage duration (34 bins in total). Figure 2.4 illustrates a curve how
self-employment rate increases over marriage duration. In a reduced-form regression, when controlling for
other covariates (demographic characteristics, state, nationality, time trend, children), Table 2.9 shows that
marriage duration indeed positively affects the decision to be self-employed. For a robustness check, I also
consider some joint self-employment in a household, and this positive correlation is still significant.
While among de facto non-married couples, there are different levels of commitment as well. It is hard
for us to use the duration of de facto relationship in the data, because there are a lot of missing values, and
it is confusing when the de facto relationships were with different partners. To proxy the commitment level
within de facto couples, I use their reported probability to get married in the next year. Referring to Table
A11 in the Appendix, I observe that the self-employment rate is higher when they report higher probability
to get married. This result implies that a more committed relationship is associated with a higher level
of self-employment rate. If a family is strongly attached to the organization, they can be united in their
goals for it, and in their willingness to contribute to the business. Unfortunately, the data does not have
information on whether they work in the same firm. However, I find that around 81% of the husbands
and wives work in the same industry among the households with joint-entrepreneurship, based on HILDA
provided industry variables, which were coded to the 2-digit Australian and New Zealand Standard Industry
Classification (ANZSIC) codes. This is congruent with the business statistics from Australian Government
that family businesses account for 70% of all businesses in Australia12.
2.5.4 Household’s labor market participation
The first question in this subsection is whether a person will make a different employment decision after
they get married than when they are single? Note that married people often need to consider their spouse’s
career arrangement.
Figure A6 in the Appendix shows that married women on average earn less than women in a de facto
relationship, which is even less than a single woman. However, married men usually earn much more than
their single counterparts. This phenomenon happens in many other countries as well. For example, Greg
(2000) shows that in the United States, self-employed women’s earnings declined with marriage, family size,
and hours of housework, whereas self-employed men’s earnings increased with marriage and family size.
Becker (1985) mentions that married women tend to participate in the labor force much less than their
12https://www.business.gov.au/info/plan-and-start/start-your-business/family-business
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single counterparts do in the United States. He claims that this is due to married women’s responsibility for
childcare and housework, which has major implications for earnings and occupational differences between
men and women.
Many papers, such as Lundberg and Pollak (1993, 1996) discuss economic efficiency by measuring house-
hold specialization in the provision of public goods. HILDA data allows us to examine the working hours
and home production hours for married and de facto couples. The following regression estimates the time
allocation in a household, considering nine combination of couple’s joint employment choice: “SW/SW,”
“SW/SE,” “SW/NW,” “SE/SW,” “SE/SE,” “SE/NW,” “NW/SW,” “NW/SE,” “NW/NW.” Note: “X/Y”
means that the man’s employment status is “X” while the woman’s employment status is “Y”. For example,
a household’s joint employment status is “SW/SE” when the man is a salaried worker and the woman is a
self-employed person.
working houri,m,t =β0 +
∑
β1jhousehold
′s joint employment choicej+
β2 ·Xi,t + β3yeart + ui,t
The regression controls the dummy variables whether the couple is married or de facto non-married,
the couple’s joint employment choice, and other covariates. Table 2.11 presents the allocation of time
between working and home production. It is not surprising to observe that women work much more in
home production than men, while men accomplish more in market production than women. This finding is
consistent with the claim in Greg (2000) that women tend to choose self-employment to facilitate household
production, while men take self-employment to achieve higher earnings.
My results also corroborate Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak’s work that self-employed women specialize
more intensively in housework, while men specialize more in market work. In the meantime, this table (Table
2.11) reveals that the production specialization pattern is stronger among married couples than couples in
the de facto relationship. If we assume that the commitment level among married couples is higher than
that of couples in a de facto relationship, this result corresponds to our main idea that the commitment level
within a relationship plays an important role in the career choice. Moreover, I find an intriguing pattern
that the household is more specialized among couples in which both partners work as self-employed than
couples with only one self-employed partner. The next section will explain how this pattern relates to the
high spousal correlation in entrepreneurial decisions.
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2.6 Why Do Couples Choose to Be Entrepreneurs Together?
2.6.1 Productivity complementarity
Casanova (2010) claims that old people tend to retire together because they want to enjoy leisure together.
Similar to her hypothesis of “leisure complementarity,” I proposes “productivity complementarity” to explain
why couples choose to be entrepreneurs together. Productivity is measured by the reported weekly income
(adjusted to the price level in 2001) in the survey. The following regression examines whether a partner’s
being self-employed has a positive effect on the income of a self-employed person, conditional on that their
partner is working (either “SE” or “SW”).
log(incomei,m,t|subject is SE) =β0 + β1 · I(partner is SE) + β2ln(partner′s income)+
β3 ·Xi,t + β4 · yeart + ui,t
where i = male or female, m = 1, 2, 3 means married, de facto, single respectively. X is individual char-
acteristics, including marital status, marriage duration, age, education, state, nationality and children.
ln(incomei,m,t) stands for the (natural) log weekly income of the subject for gender i whose marital status
is m at time t; ln(partner′s income) is the (natural) log weekly income of the partner. I(partner is SE)
is a dummy variable indicating whether the partner is self-employed, and thus β1 measures the degree of
“productivity complementarity” between self-employed couples.
Table 2.10 is the estimation results of this OLS regression. I find that a self-employed person has a higher
earning (statistically significant) when their partner is also self-employed, compared to those whose spouse is
not self-employed. For example, a married self-employed female earns 0.504 ($, in the log term) more if her
partner is self-employed than if her partner is a salaried worker (controlling for both personal characteristics
and partner’s characteristics). Note that the results are robust when I remove the partner’s income as a
control variable or add some household’s joint characteristics. Interestingly, such an effect is much more
significant for married couples than for de facto couples, which suggests that such complementarity varies
by relationship type.
From the time allocation among couples (Table 2.11), I observe that the working hours of a self-employed
man are significantly more than a male salaried worker, and the gap is even higher if his wife also works as
self-employed. However, conditional on working, a woman works significantly less if her husband is working
as self-employed, but she will also be involved in more home production. This pattern suggests that there
may be more household specialization when at least one partner is involved in self-employment. The channel
of productivity complementarity could be that a self-employed husband can be more devoted to business,
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while the wife does more household chores (taking care of children, laundry, etc). I posit that the prevalence
of family business in Australia (and in many other countries) is due to the efficient allocation when couples
work together to support the business and balance the housework.
There are alternative explanations for such “productivity complementarity.” For example, the couples
feel happier when they work as self-employed together, or they can work more efficiently considering their
skill specialization. Another explanation suggests that family-run businesses have fewer moral hazards than
regular partnerships. When the business owners have their partner as a worker, they do not need to monitor
their spouse, but they have to pay a monitoring cost if they hire other employees. As Tagiuri and Davis
(1996) claim, family members develop a strong sense of mission for their firm, and they allow for more
efficient communication with greater privacy, which improves communication and business decisions. In
order to test the moral hazard theory, I proxy this concept by economic efficiency.
2.6.2 Non-pecuniary aspects of Entrepreneurship
This section discusses four related theories for the self-employment choice within a household structure.
Each theory has different implications for choosing to be self-employed in a household, and for the couples’
jointly choosing to be self-employed.
HILDA survey allows us to examine some subjective measure of satisfaction toward a job, life, financial
situation, employment opportunities, etc. Table A14 in the Appendix summaries some of their reports by
employment status. I find that self-employed people are more satisfied with work and life balance. From
another perspective, this is consistent with the reduced-form evidence, which also shows that if a person is
married and has a child, they are more likely to be self-employed. This incentive can be crucial when one
makes the career choice; a self-employed person could spend some time with children. Self-employed people
are also generally more satisfied with their job and work itself than for salaried workers.
Concerning the non-pecuniary benefit for couples to work together as self-employed, alternative hypothesis
include: (1) they can enjoy leisure together, (2) they have complementary skills (as suggested from the
reduced form evidence in the previous section). Unfortunately, HILDA does not have information about
whether the couples spend leisure together. However, HILDA provides information on satisfaction toward
the relationship with partner and children, and statistics show that a self-employed person in general reports
higher satisfaction than a salaried worker. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the non-pecuniary benefit of being
own boss may not be easily shared within a family; but when both of the couples work as self-employed,
both of them can enjoy this benefit. Altogether, the discussed self-employment benefits should influence
married couples to a much greater extent than de facto couples or single individuals, which supports our
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conclusion that marital status affects the self-employment decision. At the same time, de facto couples and
married couples present different degrees of specialization in home production and market production, which
corresponds to the idea that the commitment level in a relationship plays a role in household labor market
participation.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a new perspective to understand whether and how family structure can affect the
entrepreneurial decision by identifying an important causal effect that marriage increases entrepreneurship.
By utilizing the 2008 marriage policy reform in Australia, the causality of marriage on entrepreneurship is
identified through a difference-in-difference approach. The policy reform has increased the costs of separating
that is new for most de facto couples but had always existed for married couples. I then focus on the two
major states in Australia: Queensland which already had a similar law in place, and New South Wales which
did not have any such legislation before the reform.
My main data source is The Australian household longitudinal survey (HILDA) from the year 2001 to
2015, which provides rich information about households’ characteristics. At the same time, individuals in
the survey have been well tracked, which facilitates my analyses on the dynamics of marriage and labor
market outcomes. I focus on the labor market outcomes of married and de facto couples, considering three
employment choices: salaried work, self-employed, not working. I document some compelling facts regarding
the correlation between marriage and entrepreneurship, which has not been documented in the literature.
In Australia, over 70% of self-employed individuals are married, while only 45% of salaried workers are
married. And the self-employment rate is the highest among the married group (21.0% for males, and 11.4%
for females), compared with the de facto group (13.2% for males, and 5.9% for females), and the single group
(8.9% for males, and 3.8% for females). Controlling for the observed characteristics, the simple regression
evidence shows that married males (females) are 3.5% (5.3%) more likely to be entrepreneurs than their
single counterparts. However, this estimation is proven to be biased by some unobserved characteristics. I
have shown that by taking the marriage policy reform as an instrumental variable, marriage would cause an
increase in the entrepreneurship rate by 8.0% (1.2%) for males (females).
Moreover, to explain the mechanism why marriage increases entrepreneurship, I argue that this causality
does not seem to come from the commonly accepted theory of family-insurance motive, because I find a
high correlation in spousal decisions to be entrepreneurs. Instead, I argue that this causal effect is driven
by the commitment to the marital relationship, as I notice that this spousal correlation is more significant
for married couples than for de facto non-married couples. I then demonstrate that the commitment to
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the marital relationship can facilitate household specialization and joint entrepreneurship. I show that the
household and market production is more specialized among married couples than de facto couples: married
men (women) work more (less) hours in market production and less in home production (more) than those
who are in de facto relationships. And this specialization is more significant among couples who are both
entrepreneurs than other forms of joint-employment. Meanwhile, for married couples, I use marriage duration
to measure their “commitment level,” and estimate that an increase in marriage duration of one year will
increase the entrepreneurship rate by 0.8% (0.4%) for males (females). For de facto non-married couples,
I measure their “commitment level” by their reported probability of getting married in the next year, and
find this promise positively affects their decisions to be entrepreneurs as well. My results are robust, for
instance, when I take into consideration some joint-family characteristics, such as joint-education, age gap,
and income gap.
Alternative theories are also discussed, such as “productivity complementarity” (skill complementarity
in production) between males and females, the non-pecuniary benefits of being self-employed, and the re-
duced moral hazard concern among family businesses. My conclusions suggest the stronger commitments
within a household could propel self-employment, and a more committed family relationship could lead to
potentially more successful self-employment (through better specialization in market work and home pro-
duction). A generalized implication is that policy that affects household formation could affect the labor
market participation.
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Main tables and figures
For notation purpose, “SE” stands for “self-employed”, “SW” stands for “salaried worker”, and “NW” stands
for “not working”.
Table 2.1: Sample description
observations
initial sample 283,523
drop disable 229,609
drop full-time studying 210,695
drop if age< 18 209,064
drop if age>= 50 157,129
drop if marital status unknown 96,237
drop if employment status unknown 96,237
sample size 96,237
Table 2.2: Marital status and employment status
Employment status
marital status Male Female
SW SE NW Total SW SE NW Total
married 45.5% 63.0% 19.9% 46.2% 46.6% 71.4% 54.3% 50.4%
de facto 21.3% 17.9% 22.7% 20.9% 21.3% 15.0% 20.1% 20.5%
single 33.2% 19.1% 57.4% 32.9% 32.0% 13.6% 25.6% 29.1%
Marital status
employment status Male Female
married de facto single Total married de facto single Total
SW 75.7% 78.3% 77.3% 76.8% 63.5% 71.4% 75.7% 68.7%
SE 21.0% 13.2% 8.9% 15.4% 11.4% 5.9% 3.8% 8.0%
NW 3.4% 8.6% 13.8% 7.9% 25.1% 22.8% 20.5% 23.3%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
sample size 21,469 9,721 15,295 46,485 25,073 10,219 14,460 49,752
Table 2.3: Propensity score of being self-employed by gender and marital status
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male female
married 0.035*** .053***
(0.00514) (0.0037125)
de facto 0.024*** 0.032***
(0.0053267) (0.0044516)
Other covariates Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0657 0.0778
Observations 42,813 38,159
This table reports the margins of Probit results. * is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is
1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is the confidence interval. Other covariates include age, age2,
nationality dummy, education dummies (less than high school as the baseline), children, and year dummies.
The baseline of subject’s marital status is “single.”
Table 2.4: Propensity score of getting married (or engage in a de facto relationship) from single: SE vs. SW
get married engage in de facto relationship
Male Female Male Female
SE last year 0.006 -0.007 0.006 0.021
(0.00492) (0.00771) (0.00492) (0.0162)
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.030 0.008 0.030 0.026
Observations 9,423 7,977 9,423 7,977
This table reports the margins of Probit results. * is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, ***
is 1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is the standard error. Other covariates include age, age2,
nationality dummy, education dummies (less than high school as the baseline), children. The baseline of
employment status last year is “salaried worker”.
Table 2.5: Marriage share before and after the policy reform in 2008
28
Coeff.
NSW after 2008 time trend -0.00126
(0.00101)
NSW before 2008 time trend -0.00482*
(0.00223)
QSL after 2008 time trend -0.00569***
(0.00109)
QSL before 2008 time trend -0.00644**
(0.00235)
QSL 0.0215
(0.0157)
Constant 0.524***
(0.0105)
Observations 49314
R-squared 0.001
* is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is 1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is
the standard error.
Table 2.6: Tests of difference-in-difference: marriage share before and after the policy reform in 2008
Hypotheses Prob > F Accept or Reject
(1) (βNSWaf2008 − βNSWbf2008)− (βQSLaf2008 − βQSLbf2008) = 0 0.023 Reject
(2) βQSLaf2008 − βQSLbf2008 = 0 0.6525 Not reject
(3) βNSWaf2008 − βNSWbf2008 = 0 0.028 Reject
(4) βNSWaf2008 − βNSWbf2008 >= 0 0.986 Not reject
(1) tests whether there is a difference in the marriage trend difference between the two states before and
after 2008.
(2) tests whether the marriage trend is the same before and after 2008 in QSL.
(3) tests whether the marriage trend is the same before and after 2008 in NSW.
(4) tests whether there is an upward change of the marriage trend in NSW.
Table 2.7: Estimation Stage 1
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Coeff. for male Coeff. for female
policy reform 0.0921* 0.0323*
(0.0438) (0.0430)
NSW 0.136*** 0.171***
(0.0319) (0.0322)
Other covariates Yes Yes
* is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is 1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is
the standard error. Other covariates include nationality dummy, education dummies (less than high school
as the baseline), children, and year dummies. baseline state is QSL; the baseline policy environment is NSW
before 2008 where there is no legal protection for the dissolution of a de facto relationship.
Table 2.8: Estimation Stage 2
Coeff. for male Coeff. for female
ˆP (married) 0.0796* 0.0119*
(0.0413) (0.034)
NSW 0.0315 0.0246*
(0.0163) (0.0116)
NSW*time -0.0103 -0.00536
(0.00544) (0.00405)
NSW*time2 0.000404 0.0000889
(0.000335) (0.000251)
QSL*time2 -0.000108 -0.0000911
(0.000152) (0.000117)
Other covariates Yes Yes
* is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is 1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is
the standard error. Other covariates include nationality dummy, education dummies (take less than high
school as the baseline), children, and year dummies.
Table 2.9: Propensity score of being self-employed controlling for partner’s characteristics
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Married or de facto Add marriage duration (Married only)
male female male female
partner is SE 0.417*** 0.293*** 0.358*** 0.220***
[0.398,0.436] [0.278,0.307] [0.279,0.438] [0.181,0.258]
partner is NW 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001
[-0.011,0.015] [-0.020,0.011] [-0.033,-0.027] [-0.036,0.038]
de facto 0.015** -0.009
[0.001,0.030] [-0.022,0.004]
marriage duration 0.008*** 0.004***
[0.002, 0.015] [0.000,0.007]
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports margins of Probit results. * is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is
1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is the confidence interval. Other covariates include age, age2,
nationality dummy, education dummies (less than high school as the baseline), children, and year dummies.
The baseline of partner’s employment status is “salaried worker.”
Table 2.10: Regression on log (wage) controlling for partner’s wage
married de facto
male female male female
log (partner’s wage) 0.396*** 0.504*** 0.110 0.172
(0.0270) (0.0310) (0.0681) (0.0917)
partner is SE 0.489*** 1.229*** -0.0335 0.353
(0.0974) (0.126) (0.253) (0.323)
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,441 1,808 549 307
* is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is 1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is
the standard error. Other covariates include age, age2, nationality dummy, education dummies (less than
high school as the baseline), children. The baseline of partner’s employment status is “SW.”
Table 2.11: Work vs Home production specialization
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working hours home production hours13
male female male female
married 1.817*** -1.616*** 0.673 3.389***
(7.23) (-5.34) (1.73) (6.04)
SW/SW 0 0 0 0
SW/SE -0.317 -1.279** -1.572* 3.655***
(-0.74) (-2.61) (-2.38) (3.84)
SW/NW 0.371 -5.735 -0.691 15.95***
(1.08) (-0.45) (-1.31) (20.84)
SE/SW 2.878*** -1.264*** -2.235*** 0.944
(9.91) (-3.81) (-5.03) (1.47)
SE/SE 7.081*** -1.077* -5.950*** 6.602***
(19.04) (-2.53) (-10.43) (8.00)
SE/NW 2.040** -2.515* 14.36***
(2.59) (-2.03) (8.07)
NW/SW -3.517 -0.781 -23.28
(-0.56) (-0.07) (-1.40)
NW/NW 26.34 20.45
(1.63) (0.87)
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,707 13,282 13,407 13,583
Note “X/Y” means that the man’s employment status is “X” while the woman’s employment status is “Y”.
For example, a household’s joint employment status is “SW/SE” when the man is a salaried worker and the
woman is a self-employed person. * is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is 1% confidence
level. Statistics in parentheses is the standard error. Other covariates include age, age2, nationality dummy,
education dummies (less than high school as the baseline), children. The baseline of marital status is de
facto.
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Figure 2.1: Overall trend of marital share in Australia
The vertical line is the year of 2008 when the marriage reform took place in Australia.
Figure 2.2: Time Trend of Marriage Share: NSW vs. QSL
The vertical line is the year of 2008. The left figure is the trend of marriage share and the right figure is the
trend of de facto share. The dashed line is for QSL, and the solid line is for NSW.
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Figure 2.3: Trend of Self-employment for Married vs. De facto
The vertical line is the year of 2008.
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Figure 2.4: Marriage duration and the share of self-employment
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Appendix
Table A1: Weekly earning and standard deviation by gender, employment, education, and marital status
<HS HS/some qualif associate BA/MS/phd
SW SE NW SW SE NW SW SE NW SW SE NW
male
married 716.83 425.88 14.12 886.38 608.64 27.79 879.81 602.42 49.61 1217.53 1138.89 27.15
(0.246) (0.455) (0.075) (0.206) (0.534) (0.176 ) (0.186 ) (0.457 ) (0.260 ) (0.289 ) (1.113 ) (0.197)
de facto 661.74 626.13 16.22 822.61 636.03 12.87 809.48 744.87 26.37 1034.02 760.38 34.33
(0.464 ) (2.783 ) (0.189 ) (0.459 ) (1.135 ) (0.195 ) (0.328 ) (0.980 ) (0.267 ) (0.516 ) (1.599 ) (0.401)
other 549.08 452.84 12.65 696.38 539.67 15.94 713.75 474.57 14.82 903.00 1024.33 20.91
(0.284 ) (0.762 ) (0.187 ) (0.289 ) (0.643 ) (0.213 ) (0.250 ) (0.896 ) (0.079 ) (0.371 ) (2.831 ) (0.170)
female
married 388.26 333.89 15.11 529.49 321.97 20.82 480.88 358.04 17.47 712.11 531.46 35.28
(0.134 ) (0.587 ) (0.063 ) (0.205 ) (0.433 ) (0.081 ) (0.105 ) (0.448 ) (0.052 ) (0.169 ) (0.782 ) (0.141)
de facto 478.77 353.66 3.45 591.07 227.51 4.39 541.99 308.21 11.62 786.17 567.06 37.25
(0.412 ) (1.521 ) (0.064 ) (0.501 ) (1.237 ) (0.157 ) (0.220 ) (0.725 ) (0.086 ) (0.326 ) (1.409 ) (0.299)
other 408.25 289.09 2.19 598.66 318.89 5.23 514.20 344.01 7.72 755.16 565.67 14.72
(0.225 ) (1.428 ) (0.024 ) (0.288 ) (1.467 ) (0.103 ) (0.139 ) (0.674 ) (0.044 ) (0.228 ) (1.619 ) (0.234)
Statistics in parentheses is the standard error. We use the derived weekly main job income from the survey,
and standardize it to the price level in year 2001. Data of price level is from OECD.org.
Table A2: Correlation in couples’ employment choice (% )
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Partner’s Employment status
Married De Facto
Male’s employment SW SE NW SW SE NW
SW 67.65 5.83 26.52 77.14 3 19.45
SE 47.83 31.37 20.8 59.74 20.06 20.2
NW 195 19 136 125 5 153
% 55.71 5.43 38.86 44.17 1.77 54.06
Total 9,127 1,630 3,701 3,526 275 1,046
% 63.13 11.27 25.60 72.75 5.67 21.58
Female’s employment
SW 8,322 1,713 261 3,083 439 138
% 80.83 16.64 2.53 84.23 12 3.77
SE 703 1,107 24 147 160 6
% 38.33 60.36 1.31 46.96 51.12 1.92
NW 3,092 685 159 763 140 153
% 78.56 17.4 4.04 72.25 13.26 14.49
Total 12,117 3,505 444 3,993 739 297
% 75.42 21.82 2.76 79.4 14.69 5.91
Table A3: Probability of being self-employed controlling partner’s employment
Partner’s employment status
female & partner is male male & partner is female
SE SW NW SE SW NW
Subject is SE 31.71% 5.86% 3.75% 62.00% 17.23% 13.91%
Subject SE & married 33.07% 6.18% 4.40% 63.33% 18.12% 13.60%
Subject SE & de facto 23.09% 4.51% 1.75% 52.15% 13.97% 14.72%
Table A4: Joint employment status for de facto or married couples
SW/SW SW/SE SW/NW SE/SW SE/SE SE/NW NW/SW NW/SE NW/NW Total
Freq. 24,522 2,004 7,969 5,403 3,440 2,045 1,199 93 1,487 48,162
Percent 50.92 4.16 16.55 11.22 7.14 4.25 2.49 0.19 3.09 100
“X/Y” means: the employment status of the man in the household is “X”, and the employment status of
the woman is “Y.”
Table A5: Propensity score of getting married from non-married
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w.o. controlling for wage controlling for wage
Male Female Male Female
SW 0.030*** 0.009 0.018** -0.000
(0.003) (0.04) (0.007) (0.015)
SE 0.034*** -0.004 0.025*** -0.010
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015)
wage 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.001) (0.002)
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18504 18564 18504 18564
This table reports the margins of Probit results. * is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, ***
is 1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is the standard error. Other covariates include age, age2,
nationality dummy, education dummies (less than high school as the baseline), children. The baseline for
the employment status is “not working”.
Table A6: Propensity score of getting married from a de facto relationship
w.o. controlling for wage controlling for wage
Male Female Male Female
subject is SW 0.107*** 0.004 0.090*** 0.016*
subject is SE 0.116*** 0.017** 0.102*** 0.026*
partner is SW -0.004** 0.081* -0.002 0.007
partner is SE 0.011*** 0.087* 0.012 -0.081***
wage 0.000** -0.000***
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,504 18,564 18,504 18,564
This table reports the margins of Probit results. * is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, ***
is 1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is the standard error. Other covariates include age, age2,
nationality dummy, education dummies (less than high school as the baseline), children. The baseline of
employment status of both subject and partner is “not working”.
Table A7: Demographic comparison between NSW and QSL
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NSW QSL
Observations 28,243 21,267
share of men 49.11% 48.60%
age 34.27 34.80
std. (8.50) (8.73)
Employment
SW 72.1% 73.12%
SE 11.08% 11.22%
NW 16.82% 15.66 %
Education
LHS 19.89% 21.94%
HS 15.96% 19.69%
associate 30.53% 34.76%
BA/MS/phd 33.62% 23.61%
median. weekly wage 492.3 1 473.85
ave. weekly wage 552.93 537.94
std. weekly wage (510.47) (560.75)
Table A8: Propensity score of getting married or de facto from single (QSL and NSW)
43
w.o. controlling for wage controlling for wage
To be married To be de facto To be married To be de facto
gender male female male female male female male female
SW 0.014** 0.003 0.014 0.020* 0.010 -0.015 -0.071 * -0.029
(0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) ( -0.051) (0.031)
SE 0.018* -0.005 0.021 0.049** 0.015 -0.020 -0.035 0.011
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.023) (0.010) (0.015) (0.022) (0.034)
log (wage) 0.001 0.003 0.013*** 0.008*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
NSW after2008 0.005 0.002 -0.011 0.016 0.005 0.001 -0.012 0.015
QSL before2008 -0.006 -0.004 0.014 0.021** -0.006 -0.004 0.016 0.022**
QSL after2008 -0.006 0.004 0.012 0.03* -0.006 0.004 0.011 0.029
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,642 5,616 5,702 5,732 5,642 5,616 5,702 5,732
This table reports the margins of Probit results. * is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is
1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is the standard error. Not working is chosen as the baseline for
employment status. Other covariates include nationality dummy, education dummies (less than high school
as the baseline), children. The baseline of the subject’s employment status is “NW”, and the baseline of
state and time period is “NSW before 2008.”
Table A9: Policy’s effect on self-employment decision
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Male Female
marital status Married De facto Married De facto
policy 0.001 -0.102*** 0.020*** -0.022***
(0.26) (-42.31) (7.88) (-15.07)
age 0.00321 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.41) (-0.09) (0.43) (0.10)
age2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(-1.36) (0.07) (-0.38) (0.04)
NSW 0.0295*** -0.178*** 0.0467*** -0.0609***
(5.94) (-37.63) (10.97) (-22.51)
state*time -0.013*** 0.023*** -0.004*** 0.010***
(-15.62) (29.53) (-6.13) (22.77)
state*time2 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(18.94) (-18.53) (-3.78) (-16.19)
kiddum 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.21) (0.41) (1.35) (-0.32)
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2593 2879 3539 3219
* is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is 1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is
the t statistics. Other covariates include age, age2, nationality dummy, education dummies (less than high
school as the baseline), children.
Table A10: Policy reform’s effect on wage
All Married De facto
male female male female male female
policy 0.031 -0.0541 -0.102 -0.0524 -0.12 -0.318*
-0.56 (-0.82) (-1.49) (-0.55) (-0.94) (-2.24)
QSL -0.0981* 0.0336 -0.0288 0.039 -0.036 -0.043
(-2.46) -0.69 (-0.57) (-0.54) (-0.43) (-0.44)
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19423 21619 10029 11779 3677 4077
* is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is 1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is
the standard error. Other covariates include age, age2, nationality dummy, education dummies, children.
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We choose NSW as the baseline for state, less than high school as the baseline for education, immigrant as
the baseline for nationality.
Table A11: Propensity score of being SE for de facto couples
margin Std. Err P>z [95% confidence interval]
Reported P(get married next year) 0.027** 0.013 0.043 0.001 0.053
Subject was SE 0.108*** 0.004 0.000 0.1 0.116
Partner is SE 0.122*** 0.013 0.000 0.096 0.148
Partner is NW 0.122*** 0.010 0.002 0.012 0.052
Other covariates Yes
Observations 6,988
This table reports margins of Probit results. * is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is
1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is the standard error. Other covariates include age, age2,
nationality dummies, children, year dummies, education dummies, and partner’s characteristics.
Table A12: Propensity score of being self-employed controlling for couples’ joint characteristics
married de facto
male female male female
partner is SE 0.42*** 0.239*** 0.337*** 0.158**
(0.013) ( 0.008) (0.030) (0.014)
partner is NW 0.014 -0.004 0.012 -0.020
(0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008)
Joint education Yes
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,440 16,004 4,812 5,017
This table reports margins of Probit results. * is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is
1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is the standard error. Other covariates include age, age2,
nationality dummy, children, year dummies, and age gap. “LHS” is short for “less than high-school,” “HS”
is short for “high-school,” and “BAMAPHD” means bachelor or master or PhD degree. “X/Y” means: the
education of the man in the household is “X,” and the education of the women is “Y”. The baseline of joint
education status is “LHS/LHS.”
Table A13: Regression with individual fixed effect by gender
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Married De facto
male female male female
subject was SE last year 0.331*** 0.274*** 0.142*** 0.240***
(0.00864) (0.00839) (0.0181) (0.0174)
partner is SE 0.0952*** 0.110*** 0.138*** 0.0943***
(0.00929) (0.00823) (0.0232) (0.0135)
partner is NW -0.0182** -0.00358 -0.00424 -0.0313
(0.00618) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0166)
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,447 16,055 4,843 5,025
R2 0.135 0.101 0.072 0.096
* is 10% confidence level, ** is 5% confidence level, *** is 1% confidence level. Statistics in parentheses is
the standard error. Other covariates include age, age2, nationality dummy, education dummies (less than
high school as the baseline), children. The baseline of employment status last year for the subject and the
partner is “SW.”
Table A14: Reported satisfaction
Male Female
SW SE NW SW SE NW
job overall 7.50 7.66 7.25 7.66 7.96 7.83
(1.63) (1.57) (1.88) (1.63) (1.59) (1.36)
work/life balance 7.33 7.61 7.03 7.53 8.15 7.27
(2.19) (2.14) (2.53) (2.13) (2.05) (2.42)
work itself 7.51 7.87 7.64 7.57 7.94 8.24
(1.77) (1.64) (2.07) (1.82) (1.77) (1.52)
employment Opportunity 7.50 7.78 5.63 7.54 7.65 5.87
(1.75) (1.79) (2.36) (1.75) (1.94) (2.35)
finance 6.57 6.54 4.75 6.59 6.61 5.80
(1.85) (1.99) (2.28) (1.89) (2.10) (2.22)
relationship w. partner 8.35 8.25 8.07 8.19 8.12 8.21
(1.76) (1.86) (2.15) (1.88) (1.85) (1.98)
Observations 35682 7138 3660 34175 3993 11579
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Figure A1: Marital Status: NSW vs. QSL
The vertical line is the year of 2008. The left figure is for NSW, and the right figure is for QSL.
Figure A2: Distribution of First Marriage Age
The vertical line is the year of 2008.
Figure A3: Marriage duration and the share of joint self-employment
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Figure A4: First marriage age distribution of before vs. after 2008
*The upper two figures are before 2008, and the lower two figures are after 2008.
Figure A5: Marriage duration and the share of joint self-employment
Figure A6: Income by marital status
Figure A7: Marriage duration and the share of joint self-employment
Note: Other pertinent results/tables/figures are available upon request.
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Chapter 3
The Secular Decline of
Self-Employment in the United States
3.1 Introduction
Self-employment1 is a major source of jobs in many countries, with around 4.2 million people operating
full-time businesses in the United States alone. Self-employed people, comprising over 10% of all workers,
run most of the nation’s firms and employ a significant number of wage workers. However, the recent secular
declining self-employment in the United States has captured public attention. Understanding the underlying
reasons affecting the trend will provide insights into the future of entrepreneurship and inform economic
policymaking.
Blau (1987 [5]) has noted the rising declining trend of the nonagricultural self-employed share in the
United States since the early 1970s. This slowdown of self-employment coincides with the declining firm
start-up rate, job reallocation rate, and firm-level volatility in the United States. Decker et al. (2013 [10],
2014 [11]) have documented this phenomenon as the “secular decline of business dynamism.” In fact, many
other OECD countries (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) are also experiencing
similar drops in self-employment, referring to the empirical analysis conducted by Blanchflower (2000 [3]).
Researchers have attempted to explain this issue from different perspectives, but no consensus has been
attained till date. The mainstream literature discusses the effect of commonly taken demographic features
1Broadly speaking, self-employment is the state of individuals working for themselves instead of working for an employer, and
they generate their income directly from a trade or business they operate. For tax purposes, the IRS defines the self-employed
people as those who carry on trade or business as a sole proprietor, or independent contractor, or a member of a partnership.
They need to pay income taxes as well as a self-employment tax equal to the social security and Medicare taxes paid for wage
workers.
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on self-employment decision, including age, educational levels, industries, and business conditions (Evans
and Leighton, 1989 [16] [17]); Rees and Shah, 1986 [34]; Taniguchi, 2002 [37]). Evans and Leighton (1989)
claim that these factors can explain about 90 percent of the variation in self-employment across age groups
and across time. However, an interaction of changes in these factors determines the fluctuations in the self-
employment rate over time. And Evans and Leighton (1989) [17] provide evidence that the secular increases
in educational levels and industry shift have resulted in the reversal of this secular downward trend of self-
employment. A similar conclusion can be found in the empirical paper by Blau (1987) [5], and he adds that
the technology development, tax rates, and retirement benefits have tended to increase self-employment.
Nevertheless, this paper empirically finds that the above demographic factors could not fully explain the
declining self-employment since the early 1990s in the U.S. And the paper have taken a closer look at this
issue and explored the mechanisms for this change of labor market outcomes.
Recent literature starts to consider the disaggregation of self-employed business by incorporation status:
non-incorporated business and incorporated business. Levine et al. (2013) [26] claim that incorporated self-
employed people have a distinct combination of cognitive and non-cognitive traits, and they earn more (per
hour earning) than their salaried and non-incorporated counterparts. Through incorporation, entrepreneurs
are offered with limited liability and facilitated fundraising (e.g. through the issuance of stock). However,
the form of non-incorporated business has lower administrative costs and regulatory burden. Therefore,
more promising entrepreneurs benefit more from incorporation, while less promising entrepreneurs benefit
more from the form of non-incorporated. (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017; Andres Hincapie Norena, 2017 [20])
This differentiation is critical because the two categories have noticeable distinctive characteristics. Thus,
I divided my study sample into three working groups: salaried worker, incorporated self-employment, and
non-incorporated self-employment. My analysis illustrates that the decline of self-employment rate is mainly
driven by non-incorporated self-employment. It is also noticeable that a number of demographic variables
have affected incorporated and non-incorporated self-employment differently and even oppositely.
In contrast to many other papers on entrepreneurship, I have addressed the gender-based variations mainly
because men and women are expected to behave differently in the labor market. Men have a much higher
rate of self-employment than women and most other. (Evans and Leighton, 1990 [18]). Taniguchi (2002)
[37] attempts to examine the determinants of women’s entry into self-employment, but it focuses on how
family-related characteristics can facilitate women’s employment decisions without comparing the difference
between men and women. This paper documents a significant gender difference in the self-employment trend,
as the self-employment rate for women is much lower that of men. More importantly, the results demonstrate
that different demographic factors have different implications for male and female self-employment rate. For
example, I find that the changing age structure can explain a part of the decrease in non-incorporated self-
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employment rate among female workers but not male workers. Meanwhile, education shift is a dominant
factor to explain the change of incorporated self-employment for both genders, but its effect is more significant
for women.
Moreover, analyzing the dynamic of employment transition is helpful to understand the source of declining
self-employment. For example, John Eric Humphries (2017) examines the self-employment decisions over
the life cycle and the determinants of self-employment earnings in the United States. When comparing the
choice between being self-employed and paid-employed, Rees and Shah (1986) [34] empirically analyzing
the data from a household survey in the U.K., and finds that the probability of self-employment depends
positively on the earnings difference between the two choices.
This paper investigates the employment transition using the panel data from CPS-ORG, which tracked the
subjects for 16 months. Results imply that the declining self-employment is mainly driven by an increased
exit rate rather than a reduced entry rate (actually, the entry rate is increasing). Additionally, I have
examined the effect of wage income on people’s employment decisions, particularly self-employment entry,
with respect to their absolute value of earnings (real weekly earnings adjusted to the price level in 1999, $),
as well as their relative earnings in the labor market (deciles of real weekly earning). Furthermore, I have
analyzed how this effect changed over time.
Regarding the underlying factors of this downward trend of self-employment, it is likely that they are
dynamic (rather than static), and the outcome is driven by interaction among various factors. To further
our understanding of this phenomenon, I have proposed an approach with Probit models that disentangles
the involved factors, including demographic factors (age, education, marriage, race, number of children, etc.),
industry, and geographic factors, as well as their interactions. Following many related empirical papers, this
paper uses the terms self-employment, business ownership, and entrepreneurship interchangeably (Evans and
Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Dunn and Holtz Eakin, 2000;
Hamilton, 2000; Fairlie, 2002). Note that self-employment is the proxy of choice for entrepreneurship because
it is widely available in many datasets. This paper investigates the self-employment situation from the year
1994 to 2015 by using data primarily from the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-ORG) (Flood,
King, Ruggles, and Warren, 2015)[35]. The paper mainly uses CPS-ORG instead of the commonly used
March CPS as the former has properties alike panel and records interviewers’ current employment status.
And the major analysis in the paper uses 1994 as the starting year because the 1994 revision of the CPS
survey distinguishes between incorporated and non-incorporated self-employment.
The paper has decomposed self-employment by demographic characteristics, business incorporation status,
industry, and self-employment entry versus exit. By comparing the results from different Probit models that
control various combinations of determinants, I have evaluated the net effect of each factor allowing for the
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changing structure of these factors themselves. Then by Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the paper has further
shown how much of the change in self-employment is due to changes in these factors versus changes in the
effects of these factors. Moreover, I have examined the transition of entry into and exit from self-employment,
and estimated the effect of earnings in the individual self-employment decision.
Some of the main results in this paper include: the drop of self-employment share is driven by the
declining non-incorporated self-employment, mostly among men, higher educated, and young cohorts. And
surprisingly, various demographic changes have diverse effects (even opposite effect) on the self-employment
decision for women and men respectively. Moreover, from the dynamic perspective, the paper examines the
employment transition, and concludes that the downward trend of self-employment is primarily due to an
increasing rate of exiting entrepreneurs over time (while the entry rate of self-employment is still increasing
across years.) Further analysis suggests that income is not always a dominant determinant for an individual’s
decision of being self-employed, and it is more likely for workers with higher income to enter self-employment.
Overall, the main contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, this paper thoroughly investigates
the declining self-employment rate by rigorous decomposition methods. The decomposition of incorporated
businesses follows some recent research (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017), but I take a step further by distin-
guishing gender which has been overlooked in the entrepreneurship literature. Second, this paper proposes
an approach with Probit models to capture the effect of various intertwined determinants of interest. This
approach is helpful and intuitive in describing the net effect of either a single determinant or a group of
determinants, minus their interactive effects. Meanwhile, the results can be visualized easily for a better
understanding of the dynamic effects of these determinants. Third, the results have rich policy implications.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the data sources - the CPS and the
CPS-ORG, and explain the identification of sectoral switchers. Section 3.3 presents the motivating facts of
the secular decline in self-employment since the year 1994. Section 3.4 discusses some alternative explanations
for the decreasing self-employment rate, and determine the variables that can affect employment decisions.
Section 3.5 decomposes self-employment by gender and business’ incorporation status, and estimates the
effect of each determinant by using Probit models with different specifications. It applies Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition to show how much of the change between years is due to changes in the determinants of
interest versus changes in the effects of these determinants. Section 3.6 further investigates the transition
of self-employment decisions. The last section is the conclusion of my study and provides some policy
implications.
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3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data description
Recognized as one of the largest surveys in the United States, the Current Population Survey (CPS) contains
a large and representative sample of approximately 50-60,000 U.S. households per month with a high response
rate (90%). The U.S. Bureau of the Census conducted the CPS to measure labor force participation and
employment. The survey covers questions on demographic factors (such as age, sex, race, marital status,
number of children, state, nationality, and race), earnings, employment (such as self-employment, industry,
and occupation), and other household characteristics.
In this survey, starting from 1994, self-employment businesses can be either incorporated or non-incorporated.
Incorporated self-employed people establish their corporations as a legal structure and usually have employ-
ees; while the non-incorporated typically do not have employees (such as sole proprietorship). To be more
specific, a significant benefit of incorporating a business is the legal status the company obtains. Once a
company becomes officially incorporated, the business owner’s personal legal liability is reduced significantly.
Corporations are treated as separate stand-alone entities in legal and tax matters, regardless of the number
of owners or shareholders the company may have. However, operating an incorporated business takes much
more time and money than running a non-incorporated one, according to the U.S. Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA). The SBA calls corporations highly regulated complex organizations better suited for large
businesses with numerous employees. In addition, owners and managers of non-incorporated businesses do
not have to answer to shareholders. The owners control the finances of the company and can do what they
choose with profits.
In this paper, I refer to the incorporated self-employed enterprise as “small business.” Note that “non-
incorporated self-employment” in our context is similar to the notion of “subsisting entrepreneurship” in
some papers, and “incorporated self-employed” is analogous to the “transformational entrepreneurship.” For
simplicity, I will use “SENI” as an acronym for “Self-employed, not incorporated,” “SEI” for “Self-employed,
incorporated,” and “SW” for “salaried worker.”
I restrict my analyses to people between the age of 18 and 65, and omit army personnel and full-time
students. I classify the education attainment levels into five categories: less than high school, high school
graduate, college dropout, college graduate (including Associate degree-occupational/vocational, and aca-
demic program), and doctorate degree. Subjects were divided into five racial categories: White, Black/Negro,
American Indian/Aleut/Eskimo, Asian or Pacific Islander, and other single races.
Further, according to the classification of the variable “IND1990” in the data, individuals were divided
into eleven industries as follows: Agriculture, Mining, Construction, Public administration, Manufacturing,
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TCP(transportation, communications, and other public utilities), Wholesale Trade, Retail trade, FIRE (fi-
nance, insurance, and real estate), Business Services(including repair, personal, entertainment and recreation
services), Professional Service and Related. I have omitted the first four sectors, and primarily focused on
the remaining eight industries. The reason is that Agriculture and Construction has a usually high self-
employment rate (nearly 40% and 25% respectively) but their share is small among all the industries. In
the meantime, the numbers of self-employed workers in the sector of Mining and Public administration are
negligible.
3.2.2 Identifying Sectoral Switchers
Although researchers routinely use data from the March Annual Demographic Survey because this broad
national sample makes national-level estimates reasonably reliable, the March CPS is not a panel survey
and covers only the last year or last week instead of individual’s current status. To obtain more information
about an individual’s dynamic decisions and their current employment status, I use data from the CPS
Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG).
The design of the CPS-ORG is as follows: the survey interviews a household each month for four con-
secutive months. Four additional monthly interviews are conducted after an interval of eight months. For
each month, one-fourth of the last-month’s surveyed households undergo outgoing rotation, and new house-
holds (or the households whose first interview was twelve months ago) enter the survey. Consequently, the
pooled sample in the CPS-ORG contains almost three times the number of surveyed households. Post 1979,
questions concerning an individual’s weekly working hours and earnings were included only in the 4th and
8th interview. The survey covers almost the same topics as the March CPS, including questions regarding
self-employment since 1988. Another advantage of the CPS-ORG over the March CPS is that the former
has recorded the interviewees’ current employment status instead of their status last year.
The CPS-ORG has tracked the households for 16 consecutive months, and for identification, it assigns
each individual with a personal ID. For each year, I keep the IDs of interviewees and match them with the
IDs in the following year. Table B1 in Appendix reports the “matching rate” between every two years’ survey
of CPS ORG. The matching rate calculated as follows: (the number of respondents who enter the survey
for both this year and the previous year)/ (the total number of surveyed respondents in the previous year).
Except for the year 1995 and 2004 when the survey has been redesigned, the survey has a high matching
rate of 77% in each year, despite the fact that many surveyed households have moved to other places during
the interview. Note, there is an inevitable selection issue because people who have moved their locations are
more likely to those who have changed their jobs, so that the transition rate may be underestimated. Panel
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data such as SIPP and PSID may be better under this circumstance, but the small scale of these datasets
may affect the estimation.
Using the matched panel data, we can identify the sectoral switchers, namely, people who have switched
their self-employment status during the period of being surveyed. Examining the characteristics of these
switchers will provide us relevant information about people’s self-employment decisions over time. Regarding
earnings, I have adjusted individual income to the price level in 1999.
3.3 Trends in Self-employment Since 1994
This section summarizes the overall trend of self-employment over time using data from CPS ORG. When
we analyze self-employment, the sample is restricted to the year 1994 to 2015. I select the starting year to be
1994 because the 1994 revision of the CPS survey allows us to distinguish incorporated self-employment and
non-incorporated. Refer to Manser and Picot (1999) for more details about this jump in the CPS survey. I
have defined self-employment share as the number of self-employed workers over the total number of people
who are in the labor force.
Figure 3.1 shows that between 1994 and 2015, self-employment rate has declined from 14% to 11% for
men, and from 9% to 7% for women. Note, the reported results in this paper when I use the cross-sectional
data of the CPS ORG are consistent with the results when I use data from the March CPS. Given this gender
gap, it worths to separate men and women in our analysis, since it is highly possible that the determinants
of their self-employment decisions are different.
Another inquiry considers whether the self-employment trends are the same for SEI and SENI. As we
mentioned in the introduction (Section 3.1), self-employed people have different attitudes toward deciding
whether incorporating their businesses. An incorporated business has the primary advantage of limited
liability, debts and obligations, but is subjected to higher regulatory and administrative costs. Figure 3.2
illustrates the trend of self-employment share by distinguishing whether the business is incorporated. It
is shown that the drop in self-employment rate is mostly from non-incorporated self-employment for both
genders, as the percentage of male SENI has decreased from 10% to 7%; while the female SENI share has
changed from 7% to 5%. At the same time, a stable trend (or even a mild increase) is observed in the share
of incorporated self-employment for both genders. To be more specific, the SEI rate remains around 4.5%
for men, while it remains around 2.5% for women. Given this significant difference between SENI and SEI
in terms of both the levels and the trends, I have inspected them separately.
In addition, we want to know whether all industries show the same self-employment trends; or does the
decline in self-employment concentrate on one or a few specific industries. In this investigation, we can
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try to trace back the self-employment trends from 1988, as the CPS survey added questions regarding self-
employment status since 1988. Figure 3.3 draws the self-employment trends by sector among non-agriculture
sectors (industries). We notice that downward-sloping trend of self-employment appears in three sectors,
Retail Trade, Wholesale Trade, Business Services, Professional services (administrative); while there is even
an upward-sloping trend in Manufacturing, and other sectors are volatile (such as FIRE, and TCP).
Moreover, it is essential to examine the dynamic of people’s employment decisions in this transition.
Does the decreasing self-employment reflects reduced entry, increased exit, or both? Using the panel data
from CPS ORG, we can observe the yearly trend of self-employment transition (by gender and business
incorporation status) as illustrated in Figure 3.4. We define “SEI Entry” as a dummy variable indicating
whether an individual became SEI between the two consecutive years, that is, “SEI Entry” equals to 1 if
the person transited to be SEI from other employment status; and it equals to 0 if not. Similar definitions
apply to “SEI Exit,” “SENI Entry” and “SENI Exit.” For both genders and both formation of businesses,
the self-employment exiting rate is larger than its entry rate. We can safely conclude that the decreasing
self-employment share is mainly driven by an increasing exiting rate of businesses. Then our task is to
understand why people are becoming more likely to exit their businesses than before; what characteristics
determine the entry into and exit from self-employment.
3.4 Potential Explanations for the Decline in Self-employment
To explore the underlying mechanisms of the secular decline in self-employment, this section describes some
alternative explanations and compare our results to current argument in literature. In the meantime, this
analysis is helpful to extract some determinants of self-employment decisions.
Firstly, we examine whether the changing age composition of the U.S. population may explain the declining
self-employment. Researchers have been concerning the effect of age structural on self-employment since the
1980s, including Rees and Shah (1986) [34]; Evans and Leighton (1989) [16] [17], Blau (1987) [5]. Figure
B1 in Appendix compares the distributions of age between 1994 and 2014 in the United States. It is obvious
that the year 2014 has an older workforce than 1994, which is attributed to the baby boom between 1946
and 1964. Meanwhile, it is documented that self-employed people are becoming relatively older than before,
as self-employed people were mainly from the 30-50 year age group (for both genders) in 1994 and from
the 40-60 year age group in 2014. Further analysis is needed to see whether age and the left-shifted age
distribution can explain the drop in self-employment.
Another significant demographic factor is the educational shift over the past decades. Figure B2 in
Appendix compares the composition of educational attainment between years 1994 and 2014. It is known
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that people have become more educated in 2014 than in 1994. Between 1994 and 2014, the number of women
in the college graduates group increased from 25% to 38.7%. On the one hand, this educational discrepancy
over time may explain the decreasing self-employment trend because educated people can find satisfying
salaried jobs, which is better than taking the risk to be self-employed. This explanation can be supported
by the documented fact that self-employed people on average earn less income than salaried workers, and
their earnings are more volatile than paid employees (Hamilton, 2000 [19]; Levine, 2013 [26]). On the other
hand, however, the empirical evidence provided by Evans and Leighton (1989) [17] finds that the secular
increases in educational levels could have contributed to the opposite direction of this secular downward
trend of self-employment. To accurately evaluate both the effect of the educational level itself and the effect
of an upward shifting of educational levels, a rigorous method has been applied in the later section (Section
3.5).
In the meantime, we should take into account the industry-shift in the United States since the 1990s.
We apply the standard “shift-share” analysis to changes in the self employment rate from the year 1988 to
2015. Following Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2013), we use the average ω and λ to calculate the “Shift” and
“Share”component. Denote λ the self employment rate in the aggregate economy. We have
λ =
SE
LF
= Σi
LFi
LF
SEi
LFi
= Σiωiλi
where ωi denotes the the fraction of labor force for sector i in the economy, and λi is the self employment
rate in sector i. Changes in the aggregate SE rate λ can be decomposed into two components
∆λ = Σi∆ωiλi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shift
+ Σiωi∆λi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Share
Table 3.1 illustrates the results of this “shift-share” analysis. The share of self-employment has decreased
2.68 percentage point (pp) in the whole economy, among which 1 pp was from Business Service, which has a
drop of 7.17 pp in self-employment share. Or equivalently, 1%/2.68% = 37.3% of the overall declining self-
employment is explained by the variation in Business Service. Similarly, the 4.79 pp drop in self-employment
share Retail Trade can explain 0.92%/2.68% = 34.3% of the overall self-employment decline. Even though
Manufacturing has declined significantly from 23.03% to 12.31% (a drop of 10.73 pp), it does not affect the
overall self-employment trend in the economy, which is mainly because the self-employment share within
the Manufacturing sector did not change much (only dropped 0.21 pp in percentage point). Other sectors
such as TCP and Wholesale Trade have contributed to an opposite direction of this secular downward trend
in self-employment. For example, TCP sector has an increased self-employment share (increased 0.68 pp,
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equivalently an increase of 0.68%/3.67% = 18.5% ) and its sectoral share among the whole economy does
not change much (only dropped 0.2 pp).
This result is consistent with the empirical finding that drops in self-employment appeared in the three
sectors of Retail Trade, Business Services, and Professional service (referring to Figure 3.3). One potential
explanation is that the fierce competitions in these sectors have crowded out some small businesses, which is
consistent with the increasing exit rate of self-employment in Figure 3.4. It is also possible that the recent
information technology development has affected the trend of self-employment. (Referring to Blau, 1987
[5]) Take the example of Amazon, which was funded in 1994 and now becomes the largest Internet-based
retailer in the world (in terms of market capitalization and total sales). Amazon.com started as an online
bookstore, later diversifying to sell DVDs, CDs, audiobook downloads/streaming, software, video games,
electronics such as Kindle e-readers, etc. Amazon is suspected to have “replaced” a lot of retail stores, and
thus many self-employed people of small retail stores gradually exit the market. (Zhang and Zhu, 2017)
Another example in Business Service sector is that the number of travel agents has dropped dramatically
due to the advancement of online information.
Moreover, we can think of a salaried job as an outside option for people who are self-employed, the
changing wage structure can affect self-employment decisions over time. And indeed, the wage structure has
changed substantially between year 1994 and year 2014. In the CPS, only salaried workers reported their
income, and we can compare the distribution of workers’ income in the year 1996 and 2014, as shown in
Figure 3.5. Note that the real weekly earnings are the reported income adjusted to the price level in 1999.
We find a significant upward shift of pecuniary benefits for salaried workers (for both genders). This finding
may imply a declining self-employment in the sense that people are more likely to accept a salaried given
they can be better compensated in recent years than in the early 1990s. Due to data limitation, we do not
know the earnings of self-employed people, but we can infer some information about their earnings indirectly
from “self-employment switchers,” who were salaried workers and have switched to be self-employed and
who have exited self-employment. More details will be discussed in Section 3.6.
Such descriptive statistics can give us some insights into factor selection, but they are not rigorous enough
to estimate the effect of each variable. Therefore, a systematic method is needed to disentangle the effects
of different factors. Instead of focusing on the macro-level statistics, I considered an individual’s decision
to be self-employed. In this way, we gain much more observations rather than the 11 years’ pure statistics
(such as self-employment shares in each year). In the CPS survey, we have information about the individual
characteristics, such as age, race, marital status, state, nationality, race, Metropolitan status, industry, and
occupation. Such excess information adds another layer of complexity, as it is important to analyze these
factors together instead of considering them individually. To overcome this challenge, an innovative approach
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has been proposed in the next subsection.
3.5 Decomposing the Trends in Self-employment
The above decompositions provide an explanation in the statistical sense. However, they do not capture any
causal effects and thus not informative for policy design. For example, the results will not help us predict
how the gap in Y would change if a policy were to remove the disparity in X, or lessen the effect of X and
Y (e.g., by providing a free educational entrepreneurial program so that it becomes much easier for lower
educated people to be entrepreneurs). (O’Donnell, Owen, et al., 2008) In other words, the above descriptive
statistics can give us some intuitions about factor selection, but they are not rigorous to estimate the effect
of each variable. Therefore, we need a systematic method to disentangle these intertwined effects.
As the decision to be self-employed has a binary outcome, a Probit model will serve better than OLS
regression for my estimation (especially for large sample size). Based on Probit models, my approach
estimates distinct effects by comparing the results of different Probit specifications. I have proposed three
types of models as follows.
In the first type of Probit model, only the year effect is considered:
Φ−1(Prob(SEi)) =α+
k∑
βtid
k
year + 1i (3.1)
where SEi is a dummy variable indicating whether the subject i is self-employed. For discrete variables, d
k
j
are the dummy variables associated with the factor j (educational attainment, region, race, industry, and
year), and k is the indicator of the specified group within this factor. For example, d2edu is the dummy variable
whether the educational attainment of the subject is “high-school graduate”. 1i is a standard individual
independent error term. “less than high-school” is taken as the baseline covariate of education; “Alabama”
as the baseline covariate of state; “White” as the baseline covariate of race; “year dummy variable of 1994”
as the baseline covariate of year.
The second type of Probit model controls year and one determinant of interest:
Φ−1(Prob(SEi)) =α+ βage1age+ βage2age2 +
j∑
j 6=l
k∑
βjkd
k
j +
k∑
βtkd
k
year + 2i (3.2)
where 2i is a standard individual independent error term, and the other specifications are the same as the
model 3.1.
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In the last type, I apply a Probit model that controls all the determinants of interest:
Φ−1(Prob(SEi)) = α+ βage1age+ βage2age2 +
j∑ k∑
βjkd
k
j +
k∑
βtkd
k
year + 1i (3.3)
where 3i is a standard individual independent error term, and the other specifications are the same as model
3.1.
The reason to choose Probit models over OLS regressions (especially when we have a large sample) is
primarily because that the decision to be self-employed is a binary outcome. I manage the three steps to
show what happens to the self-employment trends as more variables being added. The innovative part of
this approach is to decompose the effect of a single factor (or a group of factors) by comparing the trend
predicted by the model including this factor (or this group of factors) and the model not including this factor
(or this group of factors).
In each model, we can calculate the Probit margins associated with year dummies (the baseline year is
1994), which represents the propensity to be self-employed in each year. When we compare the estimation
from model 3.2 and the model 3.3, we can measure the effect of the left-out factor on the yearly trend of the
outcome. To be more specific, if the time trends of self-employment propensity are the same between the
two cases when all variables are controlled versus when we leave out one variable, we can conclude that the
net effect of this left-out variable is negligible in explaining the self-employment trend. Further, the overall
impact of all the controlled factors in model 3.3 can be determined by comparing models 3.1 and 3.3.
The margins of the Probit models associated with each year dummy variable predicts the propensity of
choosing to be self-employed in that year (controlling the other factors the same as their levels in 1994).
Then these propensities can be drawn in the same graph to compare the results from different models. The
next subsections will apply this method to analyze the self-employment trend. This approach is helpful and
intuitive in estimating the net effect of either a single determinant or a group of determinants, allowing for
their interactive effects.
3.5.1 Decomposition by Gender and Incorporation Status
This subsection will take a closer look at the determinants of self-employment trends for men and women,
incorporated and non-incorporated businesses. Referring to Figure 3.1, the patterns of self-employment for
men and women are different, both in terms of the absolute level and the yearly trend. Thus in the following
analysis, I analyze women and men separately.
Using the Probit approach, we can take the outcome of interest as the decision to be SENI, and Table
B4 in Appendix reports the marginal effects associated with the estimated coefficients of different factors,
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including age, marital status, education, industry, nationality, and metropolitan area. I select two crucial
factors—education and age - and illustrate their effects on the SENI trends in Figure 3.6(a) and Figure
3.6(b), where we predict the probability of choosing to be SENI over time for men and women respectively.
Note that the y-axis corresponds to the Probit margins associated with year dummy variables in different
models. It is conspicuous that the decline of SENI is more significant for men than for women. And overall,
the changing structure of our controlled variables can explain a large part of the slowdown of female SENI
overtime but not for male SENI.
One compelling finding is that diverse demographic factors have affected males and females differently. If
we only change the educational structure (while keeping other settings the same as the base year of 1994), we
should observe a relative upward trend of SENI for both genders. However, age has affected SENI decision
more significantly for women than for men, implying that age matters more for women than for their male
counterparts in the choice to be SENI.
Other factors such as industry shift do not appear to contribute to this declining SENI. Some other
conclusions are: marriage has positively affected a person’s decision to be SENI; foreigners are more likely
than native workers to be SENI; SENI is more concentrated in metropolitan areas and states such as Arizona,
Delaware, Colorado, etc.; the dominant industry categories for SENI are Agriculture, Construction.
The similar approach can be applied to analyze incorporated self-employment. Take the outcome of inter-
est as the decision to be SEI, we can calculate the Probit margins associated with the estimated coefficients.
Table B5 in Appendix summarizes the results. Different than the results with SENI, SEI is more concen-
trated in states such as California, New York, Texas, and Massachusetts. This may be attributed to a better
corporation environment in these states, suggesting that geographic location is a significant factor affecting
self-employment. Figure 3.7(a) and Figure 3.7(b) predict the probability of choosing to be SEI over time for
men and women respectively. Again, the gender discrepancies are apparent.
As compared with SENI, the share of SEI has not changed significantly. It can be observed that changing
age structure had a significant positive effect on male SEI but not on female SEI. Educational shift positively
affected both genders, particularly female SEI. Meanwhile, the educational shift has contributed an upward
trend for both genders, particularly, the educational shift is the primary determinant that increases female
SEI. It is also clear that age played a significant negative role in changing the propensity of being self-
employment. These results justify the necessity to distinguish between SENI and SEI, not only due to the
difference in their time trend but also because multiple factors affect them differently.
Furthermore, by comparing the results of SENI and SEI, we justify the importance to distinguish SENI
and SEI, not only due to the difference in their time trend, but also because multiple factors affect them to dif-
ferent extents. At the same time, we obtain some insights to manage entrepreneurship policies. For example,
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if the policymakers care more about SEI, or the so-called “transformative entrepreneurs” or “opportunity-
driven entrepreneurs” in many other papers (Levine, 2013 [26]; Eckhardt and Shane, 2003 [12]), they should
pay attention to the influencing factors that can determine the decision to be SEI, and strengthen the pos-
itive effect of education by providing educational programs, (or weaken the negative effect of determinants
such as age).
Another noticeable trend is the increasing share of female incorporated businesses. And according to
Levine (2013, [26]), higher educated women are more likely to be an entrepreneur. Therefore, our results
imply that policies designed to enhance women’s involvement in higher education will not only foster female
entrepreneurship (by encouraging both SENI and SEI), but also have profound benefits on the quality of the
business (by increasing SEI).
3.5.2 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
Section 3.4 have discussed the substantial demographic changes and industry-shift in the past two decades,
then the questions follow: how much of the variation in self-employment can be explained by the changes in
these determinants versus the changes in the effects of these determinants.
A common decomposition method is the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca 1973; O’Donnell, Owen,
et al., 2008). The core idea of the decomposition is to evaluate the distribution of self-employment by a set
of contributing factors that vary systematically across years. In our context, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
helps explain the gap in the self-employment rate between the year 1994 and the year 2014. As an illustration,
the declining self-employment may be explained by variations in education and aging structure, gender,
business type, and industry shift. Even if we try to eliminate disparities in these mentioned dimensions,
gaps between 1994 and 2014 may remain in others. The decomposition methods reveal how far discrepancies
in the year 1994 and 2014 can be explained by inequalities in variables of interest.
Suppose our outcome of interest is the self-employment rate (y). Taking the year 1994 as Group 1 (207,400
Observations) and the year 2014 as Group 2 (186,814 Observations), we assume y is explained by a vector
of determinants, X, according to a regression model:
y =β1994Xi + 
1994 if year = 1994
β2014Xi + 
2014 if year = 2014
where the vectors of β parameters include intercepts. X includes characteristics such as age, education,
gender, marital status, nationality, and industry. The result is that Group 2 has a lower mean value of
self-employment rate than Group 1.
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Table 3.2 summarizes the main results from Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. It is surprising that the
considered endowments (including demographic characteristics and industry shift) have converse effects on
this declining self-employment. The coefficient of the endowments is -0.013 while of the overall difference in
outcome is 0.019. (Results are robust and significant at 95% confidence level.) In other words, the overall
drop in self-employment rate is 0.0192/0.1107 = 17.3%, and the changes of endowments should have increased
self-employment rate by 0.0132/0.1107 = 11.9%. This is consistent with the findings in Evans and Leighton
(1989) [17] and Blau (1987). However, changes in the effects of these determinants could have contributed
to a decline of self-employment by 0.0334/0.1107 = 30.2%. A continued part of the decomposition results is
in Appendix (B2), showing the effect of each determinant in detail.
3.6 Decomposing Trends in Self-employment Entry and Exit
The previous sections of cross-sectional analysis have analyzed how various factors have affected the slowdown
in self-employment. To better understand how this decline will impact our economy and predict the future
trend of entrepreneurship, our next step is to examine the dynamics of people’s entrepreneurial decisions.
This section uses panel analyses to answer the following questions: whether the declining self-employment
share is due to a higher rate of existing or a lower rate of entry? Who has switched to be self-employed?
Who has quitted being self-employed? What are the demographic characteristics of the exiting and entering
entrepreneurs?
As we mentioned earlier, the declining self-employment is mainly driven by an increased exit rather than
a reduced entry (referring to Figure 3.4). One concern is whether a person is a part-time worker may play
a role in the employment transitions. Table B6 in Appendix shows the transition rate between the three
employment choices: SENI, SEI, SW, and unemployment, where I include whether the working status is
full-time or part-time. As an illustration, the transition rate from ”SENI, full” to ”SEI, full” is defined as:
number of people who switched from a full-time SENI to a full-time SEI
sample size
There is not a significant difference in the transition rates between full-time and part-time self-employment.
Therefore, this subsection will not distinguish full-time and part-time workers.
We focus on the transitions between the three groups: SW, SENI, SEI. Table 3.3 calculates the conditional
probability of transiting for those who have changed their employment statuses between their surveyed years.
The transition rate of from self-employment (either SEI or SENI) to SW is over 66% but only 13.1% SW
switch to SENI and 6.6% SW switch to SEI. The transition between SEI and SENI is moderate: 13.9%
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SENI became incorporated, while 24.5% SEI turned to be SENI. Note that these results are robust when we
control different factors, and they hold for both genders.
Overall, we conclude that it is more common for people to switch from self-employment to be salaried
workers than the other way around. And this observed pattern may be explained by the pecuniary interests
when people making employment choices. As we know, salaried workers on average earn more than their self-
employed counterparts (Hamilton, 2000 [19]). Intuitively, the foregone earnings of a “counterfactual” salaried
worker can be considered as the cost of being self-employed. This conclusion is consistent with the discussion
in Section 3.4, as an increasing wage for salaried jobs finding may explain a declining self-employment. Then
the next step is to examine whether and how income has influenced people’s entrepreneurial decisions.
3.6.1 The Role of Wages in Self-employment Entry
In the CPS ORG, most salaried workers have reported their weekly earnings. Although self-employed
workers do not report their earnings, information can be extracted from people who had switched between
self-employment and salaried jobs, and vice versa. In this way, it is possible to correlate self-employment
earnings with the earnings of their counterfactual salaried workers.
According to real weekly earning deciles, I have defined eleven intervals for salaried workers in Table
3.4. It is shown that higher income earners are more likely to switch to be entrepreneurs. For instance, for
those whose weekly earning is over $2000 (in the highest earning bin), 5.8% of them have transitioned to be
self-employed, with 3.7% of them becoming SENI and 2.1% becoming SEI. This ratio is around 3% for those
whose incomes are lower than $1400. And this observation could be explained by the correlation between
high earnings and the capabilities of a person, as a more competent person can be more successful when they
start their own businesses. A similar conclusion is found in Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger (2010) [14].
In the following part of this subsection, we restrict our sample to those who were salaried workers and
have switched to be self-employed, and thus we have data about their earnings in the last period. We divide
this sample into three categories: “SENI Switchers” (who transited to be SENI), “SEI Switchers” (who
transited to be SEI), and “Stayers” (who stayed as a salaried worker). And in this subsection, we focus the
years from 1996 to 2014, allowing for the survey to track a person for approximately two years.
From the perspective of relative income, we investigate whether people from lower or higher part of
earning distributions tend to become SEI or SENI. We pool the data for all the years, and Figure 3.8 shows
the distribution of real earning per week for SENI Switchers and SEI Switchers by gender. SEI Switchers
on average earn more than the other two groups, and SENI Switchers have similar earning distribution as
Stayers. Furthermore, female and male switchers have different earning profiles, as SENI Switchers are more
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likely to be from the lower income distribution for men than for women.
From the perspective of absolute income, I categorize our subsample into ten intervals by real weekly
earnings. Figure 3.5 shows the income distribution between the years 1996 and 2014. We find that the average
income level has risen for both genders. Then Figure 3.9 further compares the earning ratios between the
three subgroups—“SENI Switchers” (who transited to be SENI), “SEI Switchers” (who transited to be SEI),
and “Stayers” (who stayed as a salaried worker). It is apparent that the income of male SENI Switchers
is comparable to male Stayers, and male SEI Switchers usually earn more than Stayers. By contrast,
most female SENI Switchers earn much less than Stayers. However, the comparison between female SEI
Switchers and Stayers is not very informative. This sample group is small, making an accurate ratio difficult
to calculate. Additionally, the implications of being self-employed differ for women from different income
levels. This result further reveals the profound disparity between SENI and SEI, and suggests that earnings
could have affected the self-employment trend.
To evaluate the effect of earnings on the self-employment entry/exit, we apply the approach in Section 3.5
by comparing the Probit model when we control all the other determinants (demographic characteristics and
industry) but exclude income and the Probit model when we control all the determinants including income.
In this part, we restrict the sample to people who were salaried workers in the last survey and control all
the other variables.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the Probit margins associated with year dummies. It is apparent that wage has a
negative effect on SENI entry for both genders, as we compare the model controlling all variables except wage
versus the model controlling only year dummies; while the other controlled variables does not determine SENI
entry for both genders, when we compare the model controlling all variables versus the model controlling
only year dummies. This finding suggests a counterfactual scenario: if we could keep the wage structure in
2014 the same level as that in 1996, we should observe a declining SENI entry. However, the effect of wage
on SEI entry is negligible for women (when we control other factors); while wage has a mild positive effect
on SEI entry for men, meaning if we could keep the wage structure the same as earlier years, more people
would be willing to enter SEI.
To further explore the effect of wage on self-employment entry over time, I interaction term of wage and
year dummies. In the Probit results, margins associated with income in each year is interpreted as the
“income effect” on the propensity of self-employment entry in that year. Figure 3.11 illustrates the trend of
such income effect over time. It is noticeable that the individual earnings over time have a diminishing effect
on the outcomes of SENI and SEI. High income is negatively correlated with SENI propensity, especially
after the year 2003. One hypothesis is that people are more likely than before to find a stable salaried
job with decent earnings, and people who earn more as salaried workers are less willing to become SENI.
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However, in earlier decades, income positively affects the decision to enter self-employment, as high ability
employees were more likely to be self-employed, considering an incommensurate compensation in the salaried
sector.
The income effect remains positive for people’s decision to enter SEI, but this force is getting weaker
over time. It is possible that non-pecuniary benefit of self-employment play a role in people’s labor market
decisions, such as the benefit of being one’s own boss (Hamilton, 2000 [19]). Moreover, the income effect was
initially much stronger for male SEI than women SEI, although the gap is closing. One conjecture of this
diminished gap in the income effect is that due to the scale of wage increased is larger for women than men.
Besides, as previous literature has argued that education can alter people’s beliefs about entrepreneurship
(von Graevenitz et al. [38], 2010; Oosterbeek et al., 2010 [30]), it is also possible the increased female
educational levels plays a role in their entrepreneurial decisions. This hypothesis corresponds to our analysis
in Section 3.5 showing that the shifting educational levels can explain a larger variation of the female SEI
trend compared to male SEI trend.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper explores the underlying reasons why self-employment has been declining in the United States
since the early 1990s, using data from CPS ORG. The paper extends the literature through decomposing self-
employment trends by business type, gender, industry, and self-employment entry and exit. It is concluded
that the drop in self-employment is mainly driven by reduced non-incorporated businesses (for both genders),
a decreased self-employment share in Retail Trade and Business Service sector, and an increased exit in self-
employment.
To overcome the challenge of interplays between various determinants, I propose a method to compare
Probit models with different specifications of the control variables. Various factors have affected SENI
versus SEI, and men versus women differently. And it is surprising that some determinants (such as age)
have converse effects on the self-employment tendency for men versus women. For example, the secular
increase in educational attainment does not appear to influence the trend of SENI, but it has opposite
implications on SEI for male workers compared to female workers. In particular, the upward educational
shift is the driving force that increases female SEI. The changing age structure also has a profound impact
on self-employment drift.
Moreover, I examine the comprehensive transition between the three employment categories: SW, SE,
and NW. I illustrate that the declining self-employment is mainly caused by the increasing exiting rate while
there is an upward trend of self-employment entry. In addition to checking transition rate among different
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working classes, I pay particular attention to the effect of real wage on an individual’s decision to enter (or
exit) self-employment, and how this influence changes over time. In brief, the weekly income of those who
remain SW is similar to those who transitioned to be SENI but lower than SEI switchers, and the results are
similar for the exit of self-employment Such an earning effect on self-employment transitions is weaker over
time, and the pattern is more significant among male workers. Alternative explanations have been proposed
in Section 3.6.
As a summary, this paper has three main contributions. First, it justifies the importance to distinguish
non-incorporated and incorporated businesses, as well as men and women. In the panel analysis, I have
taken a further step to evaluate the effect of earning on the employment transitions over time. Our study
helps to predict the future of entrepreneurship. Second, this paper applies a rigorous method to explain
the decreasing self-employment. The proposed Probit approach captures the effect of various intertwined
determinants in analyzing the declining trend of entrepreneurship, and ultimately we can easily draw graphs
to visualize the dynamic effects of these determinants. This approach can be extended to other studies as
well.
Finally, the results in this paper are informative for entrepreneurship policy-making. Regarding the gender
disparity, the paper suggests that it would be more effective to implement differentiated entrepreneurship-
fostering policies for man and woman. Another policy implication is that if the government is concerned
more about incorporated businesses, it should pay attention to the factors that can determine the decision to
be incorporated self-employed, and strengthen the positive effect of some determinants (such as education) or
weaken the negative effect of other determinants (such as age). Moreover, policymakers should be aware that
the increasing rate of quitting self-employment is the fundamental issue of the declining entrepreneurship.
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Main Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Overall Self-employment Trends by Gender)
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Data Source: CPS ORG. I restrict the sample to those who are between 18 to 65 years old. The x-axis is the
year from 1994 to 2015. The y-axis is the self-employment rate, calculated as the number of self-employed
people over the total number of people in the labor force. The dashed blue line (solid red line) represents
the time trend of self-employment for males (females).
Figure 3.2: Self-employment Trends by Incorporation Status)
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Data Source: CPS ORG. The x-axis is the year from 1994 to 2015. The y-axis is the self-employment rate,
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calculated as the number of self-employed people over the total number of people in the labor force in that
group. The dashed blue line (solid red line) represents the time trend of non-incorporated (incorporated)
self-employment.
Figure 3.3: Self-employment Trends by Industry
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Data Source: CPS ORG from year 1988 to 2015.The fitted line in each graph is the result from linear
regression showing the trend of self-employment overtime.
Figure 3.4: Trend of Self-employment Transition
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Data Source: CPS ORG. The first (third) subfigure depicts the male (female) SENI transition: the dashed
line with “dot” is the share of people who have transited to SENI, while the solid line with “square” is the
share of people who have quitted SENI. Similarly, the second (fourth) subfigure depicts the male (female)
SEI transition: the dashed line with “dot” is the share of people who have transited to SEI, while the solid
line with “square” is the share of people who have quitted SEI.
Figure 3.5: Real Weekly Earnings: 1994 vs. 2014
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Data Source: CPS ORG. I restrict the sample to people who have reported their income (i.e. workers who
are not self-employed). Real weekly earnings are the reported income adjusted to the price level ($) in 1999.
Figure (a) and (b) represent men and women respectively.
Figure 3.6: Probit Results: Non-incorporated Self-employment
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Data Source: CPS ORG. I restrict the sample to people who are between 18 to 65 years old. For each
model, the dependent variable is dummy variable I(SENI) indicating whether this person is SENI. I depict
the Probit margins associated with the corresponding year dummy variables. The line with “triangle” is for
the model that only includes year dummy variables. The line with “x” is for the model that controls all the
demographic and industry variables. The line with “circle” is for the model that controls all the variables
except education. The line with “square” is for the model that controls all the variables except age.
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Figure 3.7: Probit Results: Incorporated Self-employment
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Data Source: CPS ORG. The two figures depict the Probit margins associated with the corresponding
year dummy variables, the dependent variable is dummy variable I(SEI) indicating whether this person is
SEI. The line with “triangle” is for the model that only includes year dummy variables. The line with “x”
is for the model that controls all the demographic and industry variables. The line with “circle” is for the
model that controls all the variables except education. The line with “square” is for the model that controls
all the variables except age.
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Figure 3.8: Real Weekly Earnings Density for Self-employment Switchers
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Data Source: CPS ORG. I restrict the sample to people who have reported their income (i.e. workers who
are not self-employed). Real weekly earnings are the reported income adjusted by the price level ($) in 1999.
The green long-dashed line depicts the earning density for the full subsample. The dotted black line (the
solid red line) illustrates the earning density for those people who have switched to be SEI (SENI). Figure
(a) and figure (b) represent men and women respectively.
Figure 3.9: Transition from Salaried Worker into Self-employment by Weekly Earning Intervals
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Data Source: CPS ORG. I restrict the sample to people who were salaried workers in the last period. Real
weekly earnings are the reported income adjusted by the price level ($) in 1999. In figure (1), the earning
ratio is calculated as: (earnings at t for those who transited to SENI at t+ 1)/ (earnings at t for those who
stayed SW). The dashed line is 1996 whereas the solid line is 2014.
Figure 3.10: Earning’s effect on Self-employment Entry
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Data Source: the CPS ORG. I restrict the sample to people who were salaried workers in the last period.
Real weekly earnings are the reported income adjusted to the price level ($) in 1999. I calculate the Probit
margins associated with year. The dash line with “triangle” is for the model that only includes year dummy
variables. The line with “circle” is for the model that controls all the demographic and industry variables.
The line with “x” is for the model that controls all the variables except wage.
Figure 3.11: Earning’s effect on Self-employment Entry
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Data Source: the CPS ORG. I restrict the sample to people who were salaried workers in the last period. Real
weekly earnings are the reported income adjusted to the price level ($) in 1999. I calculate the Probit margins
associated with individual earning in each year. The solid line with “square” (‘Rhombus‘”) represents male
SENI (female SENI); the dashed line with “triangle” (“circle”) represents male SEI (female SEI).
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Table 3.1: Shift-share analysis
Industry Share Self-employment Share Shift-Share
Major sector (%) 1988 2016 Change 1988 2016 Change Shift Share
Economy 100 100 0 6.72 4.75 -1.97 0.62 -2.68
Manufacturing 23.03 12.31 -10.73 1.63 1.41 -0.21 -0.19 -0.04
TCP 8.45 8.25 -0.20 3.67 4.35 0.68 -0.01 0.06
Wholesale Trade 4.78 2.92 -1.85 7.22 3.81 -3.41 -0.09 0.14
Retail Trade 18.37 19.93 1.57 7.90 3.11 -4.79 0.08 -0.92
FIRE 8.11 7.85 -0.26 6.74 5.34 -1.40 -0.02 -0.11
Business Service 11.94 14.99 3.05 19.19 12.02 -7.17 0.43 -1.00
Professional Service 25.32 33.75 8.43 5.54 3.76 -1.78 0.42 -0.54
Data Source: the CPS ORG. “Industry Share” is calculated as the number of workers in a specific industry
over the total number of workers in the labor force. “Self-employment Share” is calculated as the number
of self-employed workers in a specific industry over the total number of workers in that industry.
Table 3.2: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
Coef. Std.Err z P>z [95% conf. Interval]
overall
Year 1994 0.1107 0.0008 141.4300 0.0000 0.1091 0.1122
Year 2014 0.0914 0.0007 122.0300 0.0000 0.0900 0.0929
difference 0.0192 0.0011 17.7500 0.0000 0.0171 0.0214
endowments -0.0132 0.0005 -27.4600 0.0000 -0.0141 -0.0122
coefficients 0.0344 0.0012 29.5300 0.0000 0.0321 0.0367
interaction -0.0020 0.0006 -3.5500 0.0000 -0.0031 -0.0009
Data Source: the CPS ORG. “endowments” includes age, education, gender, marital structure, nationality,
and industry. The rest of the regression results is reported in Appendix Table B2
Table 3.3: Employment Transition for Switchers (Conditional on last year’s employment status)
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employment status at t+ 1
at t (%) SENI SEI SW Total
SENI 17.3 13.9 68.8 100
SEI 24.5 10.1 65.5 100
SW 13.1 6.6 80.2 100
Total 14.9 8.2 76.9 100
Data Source: CPS ORG. I restrict the sample to those who has changed their employment status in the
survey.
Table 3.4: Weekly Earning Intervals and Employment Transition
weekly earning bins ( %) Transit to SENI Transit SEI Stay SW
0 0.8 2.8 96.4
1-200 0.6 3.2 96.2
201-400 0.6 2.6 96.9
401- 600 0.7 2.4 96.9
601-800 0.8 2.3 96.9
801-1000 1 2.4 96.6
1001-1200 1.2 2.2 96.6
1201-1400 1.4 2 96.6
1401-1600 1.8 2 96.3
1601-1800 2.1 2 95.9
2000+ 3.7 2.1 94.2
Observations 10,458 29,275 1,146,065
Data Source: CPS ORG. I restrict the sample to those who were salaried workers in the last period. (Real)
Weekly earnings are adjust to the price level in 1999.
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Appendix
Figure B1: Age Distribution:1994 vs. 2014
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Data Source: CPS ORG. The two subfigures at the top (bottom) depict the age distribution in 1994 (2014).
The two subfigures on the left-hand (right-hand) side represent the age distributions for men (women).
Figure B2: Composition of Educational Attainment: 1994 vs. 2014
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Data Source: CPS ORG. The number over the bar indicates the percentage of educational attainment for
men and women respectively.
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Table B1: Two-year Matching Rate of the CPS ORG Panel Data
year match rate (%)
1995 22.9668
1996 78.28596
1997 77.44737
1998 78.13632
1999 78.5124
2000 78.40208
2001 78.43665
2002 78.55719
2003 77.11545
2004 48.2552
2005 77.16752
2006 77.25698
2007 78.6926
2008 79.20064
2009 79.1487
2010 78.83707
2011 78.80342
2012 78.66569
2013 76.17204
2014 66.60783
Data Source: CPS ORG. I calculate the matching rate as (the number of individuals who enter the survey
for both this year and the previous year)/ (the total number of surveyed individuals in the previous year).
Table B2: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
Coefficient Std. Err z P> z [95% conf. Interval]
endowments
age -0.0087 0.0002 -39.1700 0.0000 -0.0092 -0.0083
male 0.0002 0.0001 3.6000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004
married 0.0014 0.0001 13.4500 0.0000 0.0012 0.0016
Continued. . .
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Coef. Std.Err z P>z [95% conf. Interval]
<HS -0.0020 0.0003 -7.2100 0.0000 -0.0025 -0.0014
HS -0.0031 0.0005 -6.4200 0.0000 -0.0041 -0.0022
College dropout -0.0009 0.0002 -5.1000 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0006
College 0.0044 0.0008 5.1500 0.0000 0.0027 0.0060
Agriculture 0.0039 0.0002 17.9200 0.0000 0.0035 0.0044
Mining 0.0000 0.0000 -1.6400 0.1000 0.0000 0.0000
Construction -0.0010 0.0002 -5.2600 0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0006
Manufacturing 0.0001 0.0005 0.2000 0.8390 -0.0008 0.0010
TCP -0.0001 0.0001 -1.7800 0.0750 -0.0002 0.0000
Wholesale 0.0007 0.0001 6.2700 0.0000 0.0005 0.0009
Retail 0.0034 0.0004 8.7800 0.0000 0.0026 0.0041
FIRE -0.0001 0.0001 -1.5400 0.1240 -0.0002 0.0000
Services -0.0113 0.0010 -11.7800 0.0000 -0.0131 -0.0094
Public admin. 0.0000 0.0000 -1.5400 0.1230 -0.0001 0.0000
coefficients
age 0.0446 0.0037 11.9600 0.0000 0.0373 0.0520
male 0.0058 0.0012 4.9800 0.0000 0.0035 0.0080
married 0.0095 0.0012 7.9500 0.0000 0.0071 0.0118
<HS 0.0045 0.0006 7.3900 0.0000 0.0033 0.0058
HS 0.0203 0.0020 10.1500 0.0000 0.0164 0.0243
College dropout 0.0164 0.0015 11.2700 0.0000 0.0135 0.0192
College 0.0392 0.0033 12.0400 0.0000 0.0328 0.0455
PhD 0.0016 0.0002 8.9500 0.0000 0.0012 0.0019
Agriculture 0.0019 0.0002 8.0400 0.0000 0.0014 0.0023
Mining -0.0001 0.0001 -1.7700 0.0770 -0.0002 0.0000
Construction 0.0023 0.0007 3.0900 0.0020 0.0008 0.0038
Manufacturing 0.0018 0.0009 2.0000 0.0450 0.0000 0.0036
TPC -0.0013 0.0007 -1.9200 0.0550 -0.0027 0.0000
Wholesale 0.0015 0.0003 5.5700 0.0000 0.0010 0.0020
Retail 0.0076 0.0011 7.0700 0.0000 0.0055 0.0097
FIRE 0.0016 0.0007 2.4700 0.0130 0.0003 0.0029
Continued. . .
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Coef. Std.Err z P>z [95% conf. Interval]
Services 0.0155 0.0045 3.4500 0.0010 0.0067 0.0244
Public admin. 0.0002 0.0004 0.4100 0.6850 -0.0006 0.0010
Constant -0.1385 0.0122 -11.3700 0.0000 -0.1624 -0.1146
Interaction
age -0.0033 0.0003 -11.7700 0.0000 -0.0039 -0.0028
male 0.0001 0.0000 2.9400 0.0030 0.0000 0.0001
married 0.0010 0.0001 7.7200 0.0000 0.0008 0.0013
< HS 0.0020 0.0003 7.2100 0.0000 0.0014 0.0025
HS 0.0052 0.0005 9.8700 0.0000 0.0042 0.0062
College dropout 0.0021 0.0002 9.3900 0.0000 0.0017 0.0026
College -0.0109 0.0009 -11.8700 0.0000 -0.0127 -0.0091
PhD -0.0007 0.0001 -8.0500 0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0005
Agriculture 0.0014 0.0002 7.6700 0.0000 0.0011 0.0018
Mining 0.0000 0.0000 1.6400 0.1000 0.0000 0.0000
Construction -0.0002 0.0001 -2.6800 0.0070 -0.0003 0.0000
Manufacturing 0.0012 0.0006 2.0000 0.0450 0.0000 0.0024
TPU 0.0000 0.0000 1.3300 0.1850 0.0000 0.0001
Wholesale 0.0008 0.0001 5.4000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0011
Retail 0.0036 0.0005 6.9800 0.0000 0.0026 0.0046
FIRE 0.0000 0.0000 -1.3200 0.1880 -0.0001 0.0000
Services -0.0044 0.0013 -3.4400 0.0010 -0.0069 -0.0019
Public admin. 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.6940 0.0000 0.0000
Data Source: the CPS ORG. This is a continued part of Table 3.2
Table B4: Probit Results: Non-incorporated Self-employment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
m. fe. m. fe. m. fe. m. fe.
1995 -0.001 -0.016 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.016 0.003 -0.015
(-0.11) (-0.91) -0.310 (-0.06) (-0.07) (-1.00) (-0.27) (-1.26)
1996 -0.0245* -0.099*** -0.008 -0.084*** -0.022* -0.092*** -0.021 0.003
90
(-2.02) (-5.77) (-0.68) (-5.23) (-2.07) (-6.09) (-1.78) (-0.23)
1997 -0.011 -0.0376* 0.010 -0.024 0.005 -0.025 -0.007 -0.009
(-0.94) (-2.26) -0.890 (-1.53) (-0.52 (-1.72) (-0.57) (-0.84)
1998 -0.027* -0.070*** 0.000 -0.052*** -0.010 -0.0451** -0.020 -0.021
(-2.22) (-4.17) (-0.02) (-3.32) (-0.91) (-3.06) (-1.64) (-1.86)
1999 -0.035** -0.053** 0.000 -0.0317* -0.011 -0.022 -0.024* -0.048***
(-2.89) (-3.18) (-0.03) (-2.04) (-1.02) (-1.51) (-2.05) (-4.22)
2000 -0.035** -0.057*** 0.000 -0.0428** -0.004 -0.024 -0.027* -0.041***
(-2.89) (-3.41) (-0.03) (-2.73) (-0.43) (-1.60) (-2.29) (-3.67)
2001 -0.055*** -0.072*** -0.009 -0.049** -0.021* -0.0312* -0.044*** -0.049***
(-4.63) (-4.33) (-0.83) (-3.18) (-2.05) (-2.16) (-3.70) (-4.33)
2002 -0.0414*** -0.0615*** 0.011 -0.0383* -0.004 -0.013 -0.030** -0.072***
(-3.54) (-3.76) (-1.06) (-2.51) (-0.36) (-0.91) (-2.61) (-6.49)
2003 -0.012 -0.028 0.038*** -0.001 0.030** 0.027* -0.002 -0.064***
(-1.03) (-1.74) (-3.52) (-0.06) (-2.97 -1.960 (-0.18) (-5.76)
2004 -0.010 -0.013 0.049*** 0.021 0.033** 0.040** 0.003 -0.065***
(-0.84) (-0.81) (-4.55 (-1.38) (-3.27 (-2.90) (-0.28) (-5.76)
2005 -0.019 -0.031 0.043*** 0.004 0.026* 0.026 -0.004 -0.0787***
(-1.61) (-1.88) (-4.01) -0.260 (-2.52 -1.870 (-0.31) (-7.07)
2006 0.004 0.007 0.062*** 0.0461** 0.0406*** 0.055*** 0.017 -0.078***
-0.310 -0.450 (-5.77) (-3.1) (-4.01) (-3.92) (-1.49) (-6.93)
2007 0.021 0.000 0.081*** 0.0420** 0.0629*** 0.057*** 0.037** -0.095***
(-1.77) (-0.01) (-7.57) (-2.81) (-6.23 (-4.12) (-3.22) (-8.43)
2008 0.022 0.014 0.083*** 0.055*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.040*** -0.120***
(-1.86) (-0.88) (-7.79) (-3.68) (-6.73) (-5.13 (-3.46) (-10.62)
2009 -0.013 -0.012 0.057*** 0.036* 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.005 -0.129***
(-1.10) (-0.72) (-5.25) (-2.38 (-4.65 (-3.81 (-0.44 (-11.33)
2010 -0.0518*** -0.017 0.0220* 0.0298* 0.011 0.0468*** -0.0313** -0.146***
(-4.35) (-1.05) (-2.02) (-1.99) (-1.04 (-3.33 (-2.65) (-12.80)
2011 -0.0510*** -0.0338* 0.019 0.016 0.009 0.026 -0.0293* -0.150***
(-4.24) (-2.05) (-1.73) (-1.05) (-0.83 (-1.8 (-2.46) (-13.03)
2012 -0.0513*** -0.027 0.023* 0.022 0.014 0.0404** -0.0269* -0.136***
(-4.26) (-1.62) (-2.13 (-1.42) (-1.3 (-2.84 (-2.26) (-11.77)
2013 -0.050*** -0.040* 0.024* 0.011 0.019 0.043** -0.026* -0.127***
(-4.13) (-2.40) -2.190 (-0.71) (-1.83 (-3.02) (-2.12) (-10.89)
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2014 -0.050*** -0.037* 0.035** 0.024 0.027* 0.047** -0.026* -0.160***
(-4.15) (-2.20) (-3.16) (-1.58) (-2.58) (-3.25) (-2.16) (-13.52)
2015 -0.063*** -0.021 0.022* 0.040** 0.005 0.054*** -0.039** -0.156***
(-5.13) (-1.26) (-1.97) (-2.6) (-0.48) (-3.77) (-3.20) (-13.07)
age 0.203*** 0.230*** 0.219*** 0.210***
(-27.01) (-20.33) (-30.75) (-34.43)
age2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-21.07) (-16.94) (-24.19) (-30.48)
age3 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(-17.55 -14.940 -20.230 -28.450
HS grad 0.265*** 0.209*** 0.245*** 0.211***
(-30.09 (-14.53 (-33.01 (-17.39)
clg drop 0.425*** 0.363*** 0.405*** 0.342***
(-45.77 (-24.56 (-52 (-27.5)
clg grad 0.512*** 0.427*** 0.514*** 0.409***
(-57.95 (-29.95 (-69.91 (-34.32
doctor. 0.611*** 0.812*** 0.678*** 0.833***
(-44.91 (-36.96 (-58.13 -44.620
mining -0.577*** -0.479*** -0.651*** -0.488*** -0.539*** -1.671***
(-21.75) (-7.96) (-30.60) (-10.51) (-20.53) (-28.97)
construct. 0.0400*** 0.181*** -0.003 0.155*** 0.0352*** -0.927***
-3.700 -9.090 (-0.34) -9.380 -3.290 (-58.99)
manuf. -0.676*** -0.683*** -0.687*** -0.695*** -0.617*** -1.710***
(-58.54) (-36.53) (-71.10) (-44.65) (-54.38) (-128.96)
TPU -0.532*** -0.619*** -0.553*** -0.631*** -0.475*** -1.560***
(-43.55) (-30.85) (-54.94) (-38.17) (-39.59) (-106.86)
wholesale -0.137*** -0.225*** -0.179*** -0.254*** -0.0714*** -1.428***
(-10.86) (-10.94) (-16.76) (-14.56) (-5.72) (-84.36)
retail -0.143*** -0.355*** -0.195*** -0.421*** -0.0912*** -1.158***
(-12.65) (-20.54) (-20.88) (-29.81) (-8.22) (-100.40)
FIRE -0.163*** -0.537*** -0.188*** -0.583*** -0.0387** -1.335***
(-13.38) (-29.59) (-18.55) (-39.04) (-3.26) (-108.41)
services -0.180*** -0.645*** -0.224*** -0.693*** -0.076*** -1.134***
(-17.01) (-39.11) (-25.73) (-51.45) (-7.36) (-105.13)
married 0.239*** 0.272*** 0.412*** 0.359*** 0.257*** 0.164***
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(-53.94 (-46.15 (-112.67 (-71.75 (-58.96 (-42.05
black -0.392*** -0.332*** -0.397*** -0.341*** -0.434*** -0.252***
(-42.98) (-28.01) (-50.00) (-32.82) (-48.27) (-35.52)
Asian -0.115*** 0.0332* -0.184*** -0.0246* -0.0819*** -0.143***
(-10.79) -2.390 (-20.13) (-2.09) (-7.72) (-13.56)
others -0.196*** -0.092*** -0.276*** -0.141*** -0.221*** -0.0462***
(-11.41) (-4.41) (-20.58) (-8.43) (-13.00) (-3.32)
Foreign 0.080*** 0.131*** 0.0859*** 0.146*** 0.0422*** 0.104***
(-11.17 (-13.34 (-14.24 (-17.4 (-5.86 (-15.41
hispanic -0.348*** -0.243*** -0.440*** -0.322*** -0.469*** -0.218***
(-38.36) (-19.59) (-57.46) (-30.51) (-52.00) (-28.97)
non-metro -0.0850*** -0.084*** -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.121*** 0.116***
(-15.80) (-11.58) (-11.68) (-7.38) (-23.03) (-24.46
AK -0.0552* 0.136*** -0.035 0.127*** -0.030 0.281***
(-2.53) (-4.47 (-1.71) -4.450 (-1.41) -13.900
AZ 0.0749*** 0.201*** 0.093*** 0.216*** 0.100*** 0.183***
(-3.54 (-6.65 (-4.63 (-7.58 (-4.77 (-8.68
AR -0.004 0.116*** -0.024 0.080** -0.008 0.052*
(-0.20) (-3.63) (-1.11) (-2.6 (-0.37) (-2.39
CA -0.0716*** 0.039 -0.022 0.071** -0.037* 0.338***
(-4.19) (-1.55 (-1.36) (-2.98 (-2.18) (-20.15
CO 0.170*** 0.337*** 0.175*** 0.338*** 0.209*** 0.256***
(-8.95 (-12.38 (-9.7) (-13.19 (-11.1 (-13.41
CT -0.039 -0.036 -0.015 -0.026 -0.013 0.039
(-1.89) (-1.17) (-0.78) (-0.91) (-0.62) (-1.9
DE 0.0558** 0.0761* 0.066** 0.094** 0.065** -0.038
(-2.64 -2.460 (-3.26 (-3.2 (-3.08 (-1.75)
DC 0.043 0.223*** 0.049* 0.214*** 0.100*** 0.215***
(-1.79 -6.780 (-2.19 (-6.95 (-4.26 (-9.97
FL 0.302*** 0.336*** 0.327*** 0.359*** 0.324*** 0.036*
(-17.52 (-13.23 (-19.89 (-14.99 (-18.97 (-1.99
GA 0.116*** 0.192*** 0.116*** 0.179*** 0.131*** 0.070***
(-5.94 (-6.74 (-6.2 (-6.63 (-6.76 -3.510
HI -0.039 0.0878** 0.032 0.128*** -0.027 0.206***
(-1.73) (-2.8 (-1.48 (-4.42 (-1.19) (-9.66
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ID 0.091*** 0.210*** 0.053** 0.157*** 0.122*** 0.279***
-4.350 -6.980 (-2.68 (-5.52 (-5.87 (-13.88
IL 0.057** 0.109*** 0.075*** 0.120*** 0.083*** 0.037*
-3.170 -4.120 -4.410 -4.810 -4.700 (-2.02
IN -0.048* 0.029 -0.047* 0.021 -0.0423* 0.000
(-2.31) -0.960 (-2.36) -0.720 (-2.04) (-0.01
IA -0.0478* 0.007 -0.0626** -0.017 -0.017 0.106***
(-2.36) (-0.23 (-3.23) (-0.62) (-0.85) (-5.48
KS -0.0548** 0.057 -0.0591** 0.047 -0.016 0.170***
(-2.61) (-1.9) (-2.94) -1.640 (-0.74) (-8.58)
KY -0.0434* 0.014 -0.0589** -0.015 -0.0446* -0.031
(-2.01) (-0.43 (-2.82) (-0.50) (-2.08) (-1.46)
LA 0.106*** 0.173*** 0.113*** 0.174*** 0.099*** 0.102***
(-4.67 (-5.29 (-5.27 (-5.66 (-4.43 (-4.49)
ME 0.010 0.089** 0.016 0.091** 0.026 0.157***
(-0.5 -3.020 (-0.81 (-3.28 (-1.25 (-8.01)
MD 0.101*** 0.132*** 0.116*** 0.159*** 0.125*** 0.107***
(-5.01 -4.510 (-6.18 (-5.85 (-6.29 (-5.2)
MA -0.096*** -0.083** -0.0571** -0.050 -0.0694*** 0.0741***
(-4.86) (-2.82) (-3.06) (-1.82) (-3.54) (-3.83)
MI 0.0641*** 0.096*** 0.073*** 0.100*** 0.079*** 0.047*
(-3.48 (-3.53 (-4.15) (-3.93 (-4.33 (-2.52
MN 0.0688*** 0.110*** 0.0687*** 0.102*** 0.109*** 0.113***
(-3.63 (-3.98 (-3.82) (-3.92 (-5.78 (-5.99)
MS 0.016 0.062 0.003 0.038 0.029 0.014
(-0.67 (-1.77 (-0.15 (-1.16 (-1.21 (-0.59)
MO -0.049* 0.052 -0.050* 0.046 -0.035 0.087***
(-2.31) (-1.72 (-2.50) (-1.6 (-1.68) (-4.31)
MT 0.138*** 0.277*** 0.136*** 0.263*** 0.177*** 0.258***
(-6.56 (-9.39 (-6.86 (-9.44 (-8.5 (-12.79)
NE -0.0466* 0.0830** -0.0496* 0.0669* -0.009 0.106***
(-2.28) (-2.84) (-2.53) (-2.4 (-0.42) (-5.45)
NV -0.019 0.169*** 0.012 0.171*** -0.009 0.056**
(-0.92) (-5.53 (-0.61 (-5.99 (-0.41) (-2.62
NH -0.0470* 0.038 -0.042* 0.024 -0.018 0.104***
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(-2.32) (-1.27 (-2.22) (-0.87 (-0.89) -5.290
NJ 0.105*** 0.112*** 0.146*** 0.142*** 0.132*** -0.076***
(-5.73 (-4.09 (-8.35 (-5.52 (-7.25 (-3.86)
NM 0.022 0.200*** 0.043 0.218*** 0.068** 0.267***
(-0.93 (-6.17 (-1.93 (-7.17 (-2.92 (-12.33
NY 0.0611*** 0.0674** 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.082*** 0.059***
(-3.52 (-2.61 (-5.64 (-3.9 (-4.73 (-3.36
NC 0.0462* 0.096*** 0.044* 0.085** 0.058** 0.055**
-2.400 -3.420 -2.390 -3.200 -3.040 (-2.84
ND -0.128*** -0.040 -0.141*** -0.068* -0.081*** 0.119***
(-5.98) (-1.29) (-6.91) (-2.30) (-3.80) (-6.07
OH -0.032 -0.032 -0.022 -0.024 -0.028 0.023
(-1.72) (-1.18) (-1.27) (-0.91) (-1.53) -1.240
OK 0.038 0.152*** 0.037 0.140*** 0.0519* 0.155***
(-1.77 (-4.93 (-1.78 (-4.78 (-2.42 (-7.45
OR 0.029 0.208*** 0.035 0.207*** 0.0552** 0.318***
(-1.4 (-7.2 (-1.76 (-7.55 (-2.72 (-16.23
PA -0.108*** -0.051 -0.089*** -0.037 -0.103*** -0.035
(-5.91) (-1.87) (-5.10) (-1.44) (-5.70) (-1.90)
RI 0.0813*** 0.044 0.095*** 0.044 0.087*** 0.001
(-3.9 (-1.43 (-4.7 (-1.52 (-4.23) (-0.05)
SC 0.031 0.058 0.034 0.059 0.039 0.018
(-1.41 (-1.8 (-1.59 (-1.92 (-1.78 -0.820
SD 0.027 0.0591* 0.007 0.038 0.064** 0.186***
(-1.32) (-2.00) (-0.37 (-1.35 (-3.18 (-9.65
TN -0.157*** -0.021 -0.157*** -0.036 -0.154*** 0.120***
(-6.94) (-0.65) (-7.27) (-1.18) (-6.89) (-5.81
TX -0.079*** 0.049 -0.067*** 0.048 -0.053** 0.178***
(-4.43) (-1.88 (-3.92) (-1.93 (-3.00) (-10.26
UT 0.0972*** 0.167*** 0.0520** 0.112*** 0.128*** 0.234***
(-4.62 (-5.32 (-2.6 (-3.79 (-6.15 (-10.96
VT 0.0930*** 0.201*** 0.0949*** 0.187*** 0.122*** 0.190***
(-4.51 (-6.89 (-4.87 (-6.78 (-5.97 (-9.63
VA 0.006 0.152*** 0.016 0.164*** 0.021 0.028
(-0.28 -5.400 (-0.83 (-6.15 (-1.09 (-0.01
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WA -0.0415* 0.113*** -0.027 0.119*** -0.009 0.229***
(-2.06) -3.910 (-1.41) -4.370 (-0.47) (-11.72
WV -0.208*** -0.037 -0.198*** -0.055 -0.224*** -0.0526*
(-8.65) (-1.09) (-8.67) (-1.70) (-9.42) (-2.37)
WI 0.024 0.0784** 0.037* 0.073** 0.049* 0.053**
(-1.21 (-2.75 (-1.99 (-2.71) (-2.5) (-2.7)
WY 0.111*** 0.242*** 0.111*** 0.218*** 0.146*** 0.231***
(-5.28 (-8.25 (-5.55 (-7.79 (-7.06 (-11.48
const. -5.559*** -5.971*** -1.708*** -2.050*** -2.023*** -2.085*** -5.507*** -3.771***
(-52.48) (-36.84) (-221.59) (-191.06) (-102.46) (-70.14) (-55.05) (-45.08)
Obs. 1,968,152 1,776,345 2,115,028 1,903,932 1,998,987 1,836,426 1,998,987 1,776,345
Data Source: CPS ORG. t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001”. Model 1 is the Probit model
that controls all the variables; Model 2 only controls year dummy variables; Model 3 controls all the other variables
except age; Model 4 controls all the other variables except educational attainment.
Table B5: Probit Results: Incorporated Self-employment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
m. fe. m. fe. m. fe. m. fe.
1995 -0.0237* -0.015 -0.0244** -0.005 -0.018 -0.011 -0.0243* -0.015
(-2.28) (-1.26) (-2.80) (-0.47) (-1.71) (-0.93) (-2.34) (-1.26)
1996 -0.0297** 0.003 -0.0195* -0.002 -0.0214* 0.007 -0.0299** 0.003
(-3.04) -0.280 (-2.20) (-0.23) (-2.23) -0.640 (-3.07) -0.230
1997 -0.0509*** -0.009 -0.0346*** -0.012 -0.0362*** 0.000 -0.0514*** -0.009
(-5.23) (-0.76) (-3.89) (-1.17) (-3.77) (-0.04) (-5.29) (-0.84)
1998 -0.0695*** -0.020 -0.0490*** -0.0229* -0.0490*** -0.010 -0.0708*** -0.021
(-7.12) (-1.78) (-5.50) (-2.17) (-5.09) (-0.86) (-7.25) (-1.86)
1999 -0.099*** -0.047*** -0.072*** -0.045*** -0.077*** -0.033** -0.100*** -0.048***
(-10.03) (-4.11) (-8.01) (-4.23) (-7.91) (-2.96) (-10.19) (-4.22)
2000 -0.112*** -0.040*** -0.077*** -0.047*** -0.0855*** -0.0259* -0.113*** -0.041***
(-11.46) (-3.58) (-8.63) (-4.45) (-8.86) (-2.32) (-11.55) (-3.67)
2001 -0.137*** -0.047*** -0.094*** -0.052*** -0.106*** -0.030** -0.139*** -0.049***
(-14.00) (-4.22) (-10.54) (-4.90) (-11.03) (-2.70) (-14.14) (-4.33)
2002 -0.149*** -0.070*** -0.099*** -0.069*** -0.113*** -0.051*** -0.150*** -0.072***
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(-15.32) (-6.32) (-11.20) (-6.65) (-11.81) (-4.60) (-15.51) (-6.49)
2003 -0.130*** -0.062*** -0.078*** -0.057*** -0.0923*** -0.037*** -0.132*** -0.064***
(-13.38) (-5.56) (-8.75) (-5.41) (-9.64) (-3.35) (-13.56) (-5.76)
2004 -0.132*** -0.063*** -0.075*** -0.055*** -0.0923*** -0.035** -0.134*** -0.065***
(-13.54) (-5.56) (-8.41) (-5.17) (-9.62) (-3.13) (-13.75) (-5.76)
2005 -0.137*** -0.077*** -0.080*** -0.069*** -0.0927*** -0.047*** -0.139*** -0.079***
(-13.96) (-6.87) (-9.02) (-6.62) (-9.64) (-4.25) (-14.19) (-7.07)
2006 -0.147*** -0.0751*** -0.088*** -0.0702*** -0.0993*** -0.044*** -0.149*** -0.078***
(-15.10) (-6.71) (-10.00) (-6.70) (-10.39) (-4.01) (-15.37) (-6.93)
2007 -0.161*** -0.0916*** -0.096*** -0.085*** -0.109*** -0.058*** -0.163*** -0.095***
(-16.45) (-8.15) (-10.81) (-8.04) (-11.30) (-5.21) (-16.71) (-8.43)
2008 -0.172*** -0.117*** -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.116*** -0.082*** -0.175*** -0.120***
(-17.46) (-10.32) (-11.91) (-9.90) (-11.97) (-7.31) (-17.77) (-10.62)
2009 -0.193*** -0.126*** -0.121*** -0.110*** -0.131*** -0.088*** -0.195*** -0.129***
(-19.43) (-11.02) (-13.46) (-10.28) (-13.49) (-7.81) (-19.71) (-11.33)
2010 -0.185*** -0.143*** -0.113*** -0.121*** -0.119*** -0.102*** -0.188*** -0.146***
(-18.61) (-12.49) (-12.58) (-11.31) (-12.23) (-8.98) (-18.90) (-12.80)
2011 -0.218*** -0.147*** -0.143*** -0.127*** -0.149*** -0.104*** -0.222*** -0.150***
(-21.71) (-12.71) (-15.65) (-11.74) (-15.06) (-9.13) (-22.06) (-13.03)
2012 -0.229*** -0.132*** -0.154*** -0.114*** -0.152*** -0.087*** -0.233*** -0.136***
(-22.63) (-11.41) (-16.83) (-10.53) (-15.34) (-7.66) (-23.01) (-11.77)
2013 -0.249*** -0.122*** -0.172*** -0.107*** -0.170*** -0.075*** -0.252*** -0.127***
(-24.18) (-10.50) (-18.45) (-9.82) (-16.82) (-6.54) (-24.56) (-10.89)
2014 -0.272*** -0.156*** -0.183*** -0.133*** -0.195*** -0.111*** -0.275*** -0.160***
(-26.14) (-13.13) (-19.50) (-11.98) (-19.17) (-9.46) (-26.55) (-13.52)
2015 -0.259*** -0.151*** -0.167*** -0.132*** -0.181*** -0.107*** -0.263*** -0.156***
(-24.89) (-12.68) (-17.82) (-11.84) (-17.81) (-9.09) (-25.33) (-13.07)
age 0.175*** 0.213*** 0.169*** 0.210***
(-34.53 (-34.99 (-33.23 (-34.43
age2 -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(-27.39) (-30.98) (-26.23) (-30.48)
age3 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(-24.10) (-28.88) (-23.03 (-28.45
HS grad 0.0201*** -0.0257*** 0.0171** -0.0222**
(-3.47) (-3.33) -3.040 (-2.93)
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clg drop 0.0263*** 0.0296*** 0.0303*** 0.0208**
(-4.10) -3.650 (-4.840 (-2.620
clg grad -0.0653*** -0.0458*** -0.0289*** -0.0390***
(-10.82) (-5.95) (-4.89) (-5.16)
doctor. -0.0974*** 0.121*** 0.013 0.169***
(-8.01) (-7.4 -1.090 -10.350
mining -1.715*** -1.668*** -1.702*** -1.654*** -1.714*** -1.671***
(-67.43) (-28.86) (-67.84) (-28.79) (-67.47) (-28.97)
construct. -0.456*** -0.928*** -0.472*** -0.930*** -0.449*** -0.927***
(-62.94) (-58.94) (-65.92) (-59.47) (-62.14) (-58.99)
manuf. -1.732*** -1.709*** -1.704*** -1.698*** -1.734*** -1.710***
(-195.77) (-128.72) (-195.86) (-128.36) (-196.68) (-128.96)
TPU -1.167*** -1.558*** -1.140*** -1.552*** -1.168*** -1.560***
(-137.51) (-106.36) (-136.30) (-106.46) (-138.48) (-106.86)
wholesale -1.210*** -1.427*** -1.193*** -1.424*** -1.214*** -1.428***
(-115.09) (-84.15) (-115.17) (-84.39) (-115.97) (-84.36)
retail -1.075*** -1.158*** -1.099*** -1.192*** -1.076*** -1.158***
(-132.47) (-100.13) (-137.16) (-103.26) (-133.25) (-100.40)
FIRE -0.851*** -1.333*** -0.842*** -1.333*** -0.876*** -1.335***
(-95.53) (-107.80) (-95.30) (-108.01) (-99.68) (-108.41)
services -0.815*** -1.130*** -0.824*** -1.140*** -0.835*** -1.134***
(-114.56) (-104.11) (-117.04) (-105.13) (-119.21) (-105.13)
married -0.007 0.166*** 0.176*** 0.245*** -0.0120*** 0.164***
(-1.94) (-42.6 (-53.44 (-65.05 (-3.39) (-42.05
black -0.195*** -0.257*** -0.201*** -0.263*** -0.181*** -0.252***
(-29.25) (-36.04) (-31.07) (-37.42) (-27.45) (-35.52)
Asian -0.078*** -0.139*** -0.121*** -0.169*** -0.086*** -0.143***
(-8.30) (-13.21) (-13.26) (-16.28) (-9.17) (-13.56)
others -0.0621*** -0.0503*** -0.101*** -0.082*** -0.056*** -0.046***
(-4.99) (-3.61) (-8.33) (-6.00) (-4.50) (-3.32)
Foreign 0.0700*** 0.103*** 0.0752*** 0.127*** 0.0675*** 0.104***
-11.610 -14.990 (-12.8 (-18.77 (-11.38 -15.410
hispanic -0.234*** -0.225*** -0.325*** -0.280*** -0.217*** -0.218***
(-34.48) (-29.17) (-49.13) (-37.17) (-33.19) (-28.97)
non-metro 0.191*** 0.115*** 0.199*** 0.119*** 0.199*** 0.116***
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(-45.41 (-24.12 (-48.15 (-25.46 (-47.54 (-24.46
AK 0.0373* 0.279*** 0.057*** 0.273*** 0.0381* 0.281***
(-2.14 (-13.81 (-3.31 (-13.67 -2.180 (-13.9
AZ 0.0391* 0.181*** 0.056*** 0.190*** 0.0374* 0.183***
(-2.16 (-8.56 (-3.34 (-9.11) (-2.06 (-8.68
AR 0.0410* 0.0504* 0.033 0.042 0.045* 0.052*
(-2.27 (-2.33 (-1.89 (-1.96 (-2.48 (-2.39
CA 0.228*** 0.338*** 0.255*** 0.352*** 0.224*** 0.338***
(-16.29) (-20.16) (-18.57 (-21.22 (-16.00) (-20.15
CO 0.013 0.257*** 0.022 0.255*** 0.006 0.256***
(-0.78 (-13.49 (-1.36 (-13.54 (-0.36 (-13.41
CT 0.0732*** 0.0422* 0.106*** 0.0643** 0.068*** 0.039
(-4.3 (-2.07 (-6.31 (-3.19 (-3.98 (-1.9
DE -0.169*** -0.036 -0.154*** -0.026 -0.169*** -0.038
(-8.93) (-1.67) (-8.34) (-1.21) (-8.94) (-1.75)
DC -0.036 0.220*** 0.005 0.220*** -0.054** 0.215***
(-1.85) (-10.17 (-0.24 (-10.27 (-2.77) (-9.97
FL -0.0470** 0.0382* -0.006 0.0579** -0.0485** 0.0355*
(-3.15) (-2.15 (-0.43) -3.290 (-3.25) -1.990
GA 0.031 0.0703*** 0.030 0.069*** 0.028 0.069***
(-1.87 (-3.53 (-1.85 (-3.51 (-1.67 -3.510
HI -0.006 0.206*** 0.053** 0.235*** -0.003 0.206***
(-0.31) -9.670 -2.900 -11.160 (-0.18) -9.660
ID -0.018 0.277*** -0.024 0.261*** -0.021 0.279***
(-1.03) (-13.75 (-1.40) -13.150 (-1.18) -13.880
IL -0.113*** 0.038* -0.099*** 0.0416* -0.117*** 0.0366*
(-7.39) (-2.09 (-6.58) -2.330 (-7.59) -2.020
IN -0.120*** 0.001 -0.115*** 0.001 -0.119*** 0.000
(-6.76) (-0.06 (-6.62) -0.040 (-6.68) -0.010
IA 0.0325* 0.108*** 0.035* 0.102*** 0.029 0.106***
(-2.00) (-5.58 (-2.19 (-5.36) (-1.75 (-5.48
KS -0.006 0.170*** -0.003 0.166*** -0.012 0.170***
(-0.37) (-8.6 (-0.20) (-8.480) (-0.68) -8.580
KY -0.0700*** -0.031 -0.0726*** -0.036 -0.0691*** -0.031
(-3.93) (-1.46) (-4.16) (-1.70) (-3.88) (-1.46)
99
LA 0.0571** 0.103*** 0.060** 0.099*** 0.059** 0.102***
(-2.97 (-4.52 (-3.18 (-4.41 (-3.07 (-4.49
ME 0.130*** 0.160*** 0.153*** 0.172*** 0.128*** 0.157***
(-7.83 (-8.18 (-9.39 (-8.89 (-7.73 (-8.01
MD -0.129*** 0.108*** -0.105*** 0.119*** -0.134*** 0.107***
(-7.18) (-5.28 (-5.95) -5.840 (-7.45) -5.200
MA 0.027 0.079*** 0.046** 0.092*** 0.021 0.074***
(-1.64 (-4.07 -2.840 (-4.82 (-1.26 (-3.83
MI -0.0667*** 0.0466* -0.0619*** 0.0495** -0.065*** 0.047*
(-4.20) (-2.51 (-3.97) (-2.7 (-4.09) -2.520
MN -0.013 0.116*** -0.011 0.116*** -0.021 0.113***
(-0.82) (-6.17 (-0.72) (-6.20) (-1.29) (-5.99
MS 0.026 0.015 0.025 0.014 0.023 0.014
(-1.36 (-0.65 (-1.3 (-0.63 (-1.16 (-0.59
MO -0.019 0.0863*** -0.017 0.084*** -0.018 0.087***
(-1.11) (-4.27 (-1.03) -4.190 (-1.03) (-4.31
MT 0.120*** 0.257*** 0.132*** 0.259*** 0.117*** 0.258***
(-6.98 (-12.8 -7.780 (-13 (-6.76 (-12.79
NE 0.037* 0.107*** 0.040* 0.102*** 0.0335* 0.106***
(-2.26 (-5.47 (-2.47 (-5.3 (-2.04 (-5.45
NV -0.202*** 0.053* -0.167*** 0.0621** -0.196*** 0.056**
(-10.85) (-2.5 (-9.19) -2.960 (-10.56) -2.620
NH 0.0725*** 0.107*** 0.091*** 0.116*** 0.067*** 0.104***
(-4.39 (-5.46 -5.620 -5.960 (-4.07 (-5.29
NJ -0.117*** -0.071*** -0.084*** -0.051** -0.121*** -0.075***
(-7.22) (-3.63) (-5.29) (-2.64) (-7.48) (-3.86)
NM 0.072*** 0.267*** 0.116*** 0.297*** 0.065*** 0.267***
(-3.78 (-12.33 (-6.2 (-13.8 -3.440 -12.330
NY -0.022 0.0633*** 0.005 0.077*** -0.026 0.059***
(-1.53) (-3.62 (-0.32 (-4.47 (-1.78) (-3.36
NC 0.000 0.056** 0.007 0.057** -0.003 0.0545**
(-0.01 (-2.91 (-0.42 -3.030 (-0.20) (-2.84
ND 0.129*** 0.122*** 0.130*** 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.119***
(-7.96 (-6.2 (-8.2 (-5.92 (-7.52 (-6.07
OH -0.040** 0.024 -0.0320* 0.026 -0.038* 0.023
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(-2.58) -1.310 (-2.11) (-1.42 (-2.44) (-1.24
OK 0.0880*** 0.154*** 0.0911*** 0.151*** 0.089*** 0.155***
(-4.97 (-7.42 (-5.25 (-7.37 (-5.03 (-7.45
OR 0.065*** 0.315*** 0.077*** 0.316*** 0.064*** 0.318***
(-3.78 (-16.09 (-4.58 (-16.3 (-3.71 (-16.23
PA 0.010 -0.031 0.028 -0.023 0.010 -0.035
(-0.66 (-1.69) (-1.88 (-1.26) -0.670 (-1.90)
RI -0.042* 0.003 -0.018 0.015 -0.044* 0.001
(-2.28) (-0.14 (-1.03) (-0.73 (-2.42) (-0.05)
SC -0.010 0.019 0.000 0.021 -0.012 0.018
(-0.55) (-0.86 -0.010 -0.950 (-0.64) -0.820
SD 0.109*** 0.188*** 0.107*** 0.183*** 0.103*** 0.186***
(-6.76 (-9.77 (-6.74 (-9.64 (-6.38 (-9.65
TN 0.166*** 0.120*** 0.162*** 0.117*** 0.167*** 0.120***
(-9.64 (-5.81 (-9.61 (-5.71 (-9.72 (-5.81
TX 0.141*** 0.177*** 0.154*** 0.185*** 0.138*** 0.178***
(-9.79 (-10.21 (-10.85 (-10.8 (-9.57 (-10.26)
UT -0.043* 0.231*** -0.091*** 0.183*** -0.045* 0.234***
(-2.27) (-10.84) (-4.90) -8.730 (-2.37) (-10.96)
VT 0.114*** 0.195*** 0.137*** 0.204*** 0.108*** 0.190***
(-6.78 (-9.87 (-8.29 (-10.45 (-6.43 (-9.63
VA -0.116*** 0.030 -0.096*** 0.036 -0.119*** 0.028
(-6.84) (-1.5) (-5.80) (-1.82 (-7.02) (-1.42
WA -0.032 0.229*** -0.018 0.231*** -0.035* 0.229***
(-1.88) (-11.71 (-1.05) (-11.95 (-2.06) (-11.72)
WV -0.155*** -0.052* -0.147*** -0.051* -0.148*** -0.053*
(-8.12) (-2.32) (-7.87) (-2.31) (-7.76) (-2.37)
WI -0.018 0.0551** -0.005 0.0551** -0.021 0.0525**
(-1.11) (-2.83 (-0.32) (-2.87) (-1.27) (-2.70)
WY -0.072*** 0.230*** -0.056** 0.226*** -0.074*** 0.231***
(-4.07) (-11.4 (-3.21) (-11.36) (-4.18) (-11.48)
const. -3.400*** -3.800*** -0.508*** -0.544*** -3.310*** -3.771***
(-49.60) (-45.39) (-30.85) (-25.48) (-48.26) (-45.08)
Obs. 1,968,152 1,776,345 2,115,028 1,903,932 1,968,152 1,776,345 1,968,152 1,776,345
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Data Source: CPS ORG. t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001”. Model 1 is the Probit model
that controls all the variables; Model 2 only controls year dummy variables; Model 3 controls all the other variables
except age; Model 4 controls all the other variables except educational attainment.
Table B6: Employment Transition Matrix for the Full Sample
employment status at t+ 1
at t (%) SENI, full SENI, part SEI, full SEI, part SW, full SW, part unemp Total
SENI, full 2.5 0.3 0.4 0 1.6 0.3 0.1 5.3
SENI, part 0.3 0.6 0 0 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.6
SEI, full 0.4 0.1 1.6 0.1 1.1 0.2 0 3.6
SEI, part 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.5
SW, full 1.3 0.4 0.9 0.1 64.9 4.6 2.5 74.6
SW, part 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 4.2 4.7 0.5 10
unemp 0.1 0.1 0 0 2.2 0.6 1.4 4.4
Total 4.9 1.6 3.2 0.5 74.5 10.7 4.6 100
Data Source: CPS ORG. “full” (“part”) means “full-time worker” (“part-time workers”). Each cell represents the
percentage of that combination of employment status. For example, the cell associated with “SW, full at t; SW, full
at t+ 1” is 64.9, indicating that 64.9% of the sample are full-time salaried workers for the two consecutive years.
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